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In Chapter I, a two capital stock adjustment cost model is used to find the effects on 
productive capital investment of environmental regulation, which forces firms to invest in 
pollution control equipment.  The empirical results show that, for most industries during 
the 1970’s and 1980’s, abatement investment stimulates productive investment.  This 
suggests economies of scope between the two types of capital.  
 
The result is surprising in light of general equilibrium effects, as well as the naïve view of 
adjustment costs, that would cause investment in abatement equipment to have an 
unambiguously negative effect on investment in productive capital.  The results have 
implications beyond the scope of this paper.  Finding economies of scope in other 
investment pairs will have strong implications when it comes to government policy 
regarding the control of the composition of total investment.   
  vi
 
Not all forest amenities are derived from rotation length. Chapter II extends current 
forestry economics literature by allowing firms to optimize both over rotation time and 
harvest density.  I use a two-part tax instrument, a “clear-cut” tax combined with a lump 
sum licensing fee, to correct for market inefficiency.  The sign and magnitude of the 
taxes depends upon the externality.  In general, the licensing fee can optimally take the 
form of either a tax or a subsidy.  A stylized numerical model shows a case where a clear-
cut tax can be used with a licensing subsidy to correct for market inefficiency.   
 
In Chapter III risk assessment and risk management aspects of an environmental health 
problem are fused.  Damages from fetal Bisphenol-A exposure are quantified using risk 
assessment methods. The variability and uncertainty are tracked throughout the entire 
model. The final distribution reflects variation in exposure, uncertainty and variability in 
dose response, and in the estimates of the economic costs of the outcomes.  The 
methodology can be extended to the assessment of other harmful environmental 
chemicals.   
 
The expected damages from future cancers due to fetal BPA exposure are surprisingly 
small.  However, the estimated distribution is not narrow.  This model demonstrates the 
type of regulatory benefits analysis on which policy regulating environmental chemicals 
should be based. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
This dissertation delves into a wide variety of topics including investment and abatement, 
forest thinning and taxes, and environmental estrogens and risk assessment.  In doing so, 
it uses a wide variety of economic techniques: theoretical, econometric, computational, 
and benefit/cost analyses. 
 
In Chapter I, “Environmental Regulation:  Does Federally Mandated Pollution 
Abatement Investment Lead to Less Productive Investment?” I measure the correlation 
between a firm’s investment in pollution abatement equipment and its investment in other 
types of capital.   
 
Environmental regulation, its effectiveness, and its effects on output have been hot topics 
for the last thirty years.  With increasing environmental awareness in the late 60's and 
early 70's, the number of federal environmental regulations grew rapidly. As part of the 
new regulation, firms were often required to invest in otherwise unproductive pollution 
abatement capital.  Some industries were hit particularly hard.  For instance, in 1973 
pollution abatement investment constituted almost thirty percent of the petroleum 
refining industry's total investment.  In the primary metals and paper industries, more 
than twenty percent of total investment went to the reduction of pollution.  At the same 
time that environmental regulation was growing, the U.S. saw a slowdown in 
productivity growth and productive capital formation.  Some implicitly blame the 
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regulation for crowding out productive investment.  Others say the regulation was 
insignificant in the economic slowdown.   
 
This paper empirically tests whether pollution abatement investment actually crowds out 
productive investment.  I use an adjustment cost model that allows firms to invest in two 
different types of capital.  For the U.S., between 1973 and 1993, I am able to reject 
crowding out at the two-digit industry level.  Furthermore, I find a positive correlation 
between productive and abatement investment, suggesting economies of scope between 
the two.   
 
In Chapter II, “Considering Harvest Percentage in a Forest with Standing Value:  
Capturing External Benefits Derived from Forest Density”, I analyze a Faustian forestry 
model where the logging firm can choose what percentage of each acre it wishes to 
harvest.   
 
Over 150 years ago, Martin Faustmann (1849) contributed what would be the key model 
and starting point for any study of multiple-period, optimal forest rotation.  Just within 
the last 30 years, in the shadow of declining quality forest area and increased 
conservation efforts, much has been written pertaining to optimal forest rotation.  
However, very little attention has been given to the optimal harvest percentage per acre. 
 
This chapter extends current forestry literature by allowing the forest planner and private 
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landowner to choose not only the rotation time, but also how many trees per acre to cut.  
Many forest amenities are derived not only from the age of the trees, but also from the 
density of the trees.  In the case of some forest externalities such as erosion control, it is 
possible that the clear-cutting of a forest might result in much larger damages than would 
occur with selective cutting.  
 
 The regulation of the percentage of trees cut per acre may dampen some of the 
externality paths and thus avert such disasters as the one experienced in Portland, Oregon 
in 1995. Massive landslides, occurring mostly in areas of clear-cutting, contaminated the 
entire city’s water supply and caused millions of dollars of damage.  The damage was so 
great that in a recent election, Oregonians were asked to vote on a referendum that would 
have banned clear-cutting completely.  Furthermore, the immense, costly forest fires 
occurring all over the Western U.S. in 2002 make it obvious that letting forests grow 
without management can be as bad as clear-cutting.  Therefore, on forest lands that are in 
danger of falling victim to a wildfire and would not otherwise be logged, it may be 
prudent to provide a firm with incentive to harvest some percentage significantly greater 
than zero.  In either case, the consideration of harvest percentage is an important part of 
forest management and has been ignored in the forest economics literature thus far.      
 
This paper focuses on the case where a logging firm does not internalize the benefits 
from leaving some trees uncut and therefore chooses to clear-cut.  I present a pair of tax 
instruments that could optimally control clear-cutting rather than banning it completely. 
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In Chapter III, “A Risk Assessment of Bisphenol-A:  Accounting for Medical 
Uncertainty and Data Limitations in Environmental Health Problems”, I estimate the 
damages due to the unregulated use of Bisphenol-A, an endocrine disrupter found in 
polycarbonate plastics, dental fillings, the linings of aluminum and tin cans, and in 
contaminated water supplies.  Endocrine disrupters--synthetic chemicals that mimic the 
effects of human hormones, particularly estrogen--can cause fetal deformities, cancer, 
and can reduce sperm production.  Estimating the possible damages is important to our 
current government policy, but is also an interesting and formidable economic problem 
due to the uncertainty arising in toxicology.      
 
Many problems in environmental economics deal with carcinogenic chemicals and the 
medical uncertainty that comes with them.  And though the science is still uncertain, 
Congress has already passed three laws, the Food Quality Protection Act (1996), the Safe 
Drinking Water Act (1996), and the Hormone Disruption Research Act (2002), aimed at 
dealing with endocrine disruptors.  On one hand, this legislation is important in 
safeguarding the public health.  On the other hand, as chemical firms are quick to 
emphasize, these chemicals are very useful, and we should be very careful in passing 
legislation that regulates or prohibits them.  
 
The difficulty arises in estimating the per capita dose-response function.  First, all of the 
pathways that people can be exposed to Bisphenol-A must be considered in order to 
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estimate per capita dosage properly. Second, research on endocrine disrupters requires 
clinical trials, where non-human subjects are typically exposed to doses of the chemical 
that are much higher than humans encounter in the environment. Furthermore, current 
research on Bisphenol-A shows that it can alter fetal and child development at very small 
doses even though negative effects are minimal at high doses.  
 
In this study I use a risk assessment approach to provide a framework for estimating the 
cost of human consumption of chemicals where the dose-response relationship is 
uncertain.  However, I extend current methodology in several significant ways.  First, 
while risk assessment has come a long way towards quantifying uncertainty and 
variability in models in past five years, current practice in the field still typically relies on 
the construction of point estimates, or distributions that rely on at least some point 
estimates. In this model, I estimate a distribution of damages the chemical may cause.  
The distribution reflects:  (1) uncertainty in the varying doses received by different 
groups in the population, (2) uncertainty and variability in the physiological response to 
these doses, and (3) uncertainty and variability in the estimates of the economic costs of 
these responses.  Second, I quantify these uncertainties throughout the model.  
Furthermore, although risk assessment and risk management are typically thought of 
separately, this model combines risk assessment and benefit-cost analysis in a framework 
that can easily be used to analyze the implications of different policies, using current 
exposure as a baseline. Though steps have already been taken to regulate endocrine 
disrupters, no such study has been done.   
  6
 
This particular model concentrates on quantifying the health costs of future cancers 
caused by fetal exposure to BPA in utero.   
  7
 
Chapter I 
Environmental Regulation:  Does Federally Mandated Pollution 
Abatement Investment Lead to Less Productive Investment? 
 
 
 
1.  Introductory Remarks and Review of the Relevant Literature 
Environmental regulation, its effectiveness, and its effects on output have been hot topics 
for the last thirty years.  With increasing environmental awareness in the late 60's and 
early 70's, the number of federal environmental regulations grew rapidly. 1  As part of the 
new regulation, firms were often required to invest in otherwise unproductive pollution 
abatement capital (e.g. end of pipe abatement devices).  Some industries were hit 
particularly hard.  For instance, pollution abatement investment constituted almost thirty 
percent of the petroleum refining industry's total investment in 1973.  In the primary 
metals and paper industries, more than twenty percent of total investment went to the 
reduction of pollution.   
 
At the same time environmental regulation was growing, the U.S. saw a slowdown in 
productivity growth and productive capital formation (Summers, 1981).  Some literature 
has suggested that the slowdown in growth is due to a drop in productive capital 
formation (Clark, 1978, and Norsworthy, et al., 1979).  Many have pointed their fingers 
at the increase in environmental regulation as the cause of the drop in productive capital 
                                                          
1 Major legislation:  Clean Air Act (1965), National Environmental Policy Act (1970), Amendments to the 
Clean Air Act (1970),  Clean Water Act (1972), Amendments to the Clean Air Act (1977), Amendments to 
the Clean Water 
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formation, stating that firms’ investment in productive capital is crowded out by the now-
mandatory investment in pollution abatement equipment.  In accounting for a slowdown 
in growth due to environmental regulation, some of this literature implicitly assumes that 
productive investment is crowded out by abatement investment (Denison, 1979, 
Norsworthy, et al., 1979, Christiansen and Haveman, 1981, Marks, 1991, Collins, 1996).   
Gray and Shadbegian (1998) test for crowding out in the pulp and paper industry.  They 
find that investment in pollution abatement equipment and productive equipment tends to 
happen at the same time.  However, they find that paper mills that invest in relatively 
more abatement equipment invest less in productive equipment later on.  Porter and van 
der Linde (1995) suggest that this crowding out was insignificant and was not a factor in 
the economic slowdown of the 70’s.   
 
This paper empirically tests whether pollution abatement investment actually crowds out 
productive investment.  I use an adjustment cost model that allows firms to invest in two 
different types of capital, an application stemming from a model introduced originally by 
Wilcoxen (1990).  For the U.S., between 1973 and 1993, my results show that the 
crowding out hypothesis can be rejected for a range of industries.  Furthermore I find a 
positive correlation between productive and abatement investment in some industries, 
suggesting economies of scope between the two.           
 
Part 2 of this paper discusses the theoretical adjustment cost model in detail, while Part 3 
discusses the different possible econometric models implied by the theoretical model. 
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Part 4 covers the nature and properties of the data used to estimate the model, while Part 
5 provides the empirical results and a discussion of the implications.   
 
2.  Theoretical Groundwork      
This paper generalizes Tobin’s (1969) q-theoretic single capital stock adjustment cost 
model to incorporate two capital stocks (productive capital and pollution abatement 
capital).  The adjustment cost mechanism allows for the possibility of crowding-out or 
crowding-in of productive investment by abatement investment.  
 
In the q-theoretic model, originally suggested by James Tobin (1969), a firm’s rate of 
investment is a function of “q”, where q is the ratio of the market value of new additional 
capital investment to its replacement cost.  When the firm can freely change its capital 
stock, it will increase or decrease capital investment until q equals one, or equivalently, 
until the marginal market value of new capital equals the capital’s replacement cost.  
When convex costs of capital installation are assumed, this model is equivalent to a 
model where adjustment costs are introduced implicitly through a lag function of 
investment. However, as Hayashi (1982) points out, the q-theoretical model has the 
advantage in that it allows output to be an endogenous decision.   
 
Thus, when a firm faces convex costs of capital installation, a large investment in 
pollution control equipment might lead to a decrease in the investment of productive 
capital by raising its marginal cost.  For instance, if adjustment costs arise because 
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managers become less efficient when faced with large amounts of new investment, then 
adjustment costs depend on the total amount of investment regardless of the type.  In this 
case, abatement investment could crowd out productive investment on a one-to-one basis.  
However, full offset is not likely.   In general, the adjustment cost function could include 
economies or diseconomies of scope.  If economies of scope exist, then abatement 
investment could actually stimulate productive investment.  Thus, it becomes impossible 
to determine analytically the effects of pollution abatement investment on the marginal 
cost of productive capital.  
 
The rest of this section presents a model of optimal investment for multiple capital goods 
with adjustment costs, followed by the application of the general model to two specific 
capital stocks: abatement and productive capital.  
 
A profit maximizing firm choosing among n types of capital will solve the following 
infinite horizon model: 
(1.1)  { }∫
∞
−−=
0
)(),,(max dteIPWIKV tRKI π  
(1.2)      s.t:              KIK δ−=•  
 
Where,  K  is a vector of   n  capital stocks,  I   is the corresponding vector of investment 
in   K,  PK  is a vector of purchase prices for capital types at time  t,  W  is a vector of 
input and output prices at time  t,  δ  is a diagonal matrix of depreciation 
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rates, ∫≡
t
sdsrtR
0
)(  and  rs  is the interest rate at time  s,  π(K,I,W) is the firm’s profit 
function, capturing both the rent on capital and internal adjustment costs. 3 
 
Setting up and differentiating the Hamiltonian, and making use of a transversality 
condition that requires the current marginal value of capital,  λ,  to grow more slowly 
than r + δ,  provides the following  3n  first order conditions for optimality in investment 
at time zero: 4 
 
(1.3)                                                  πλ IKP ∇−=  
(1.4)         ∫∇=
∞ +−
0
))(( dte tJtRK
δπλ     
(1.5)      KIK δ−=•  
 
Where ∇I, ∇K, denote partial derivatives with respect to multiple investment and capital 
types, and J  is the identity matrix.   Intuition for these results are discussed after the 
following example. 
 
Now that the first-order conditions have been shown for the general, n capital case, these 
results can be applied to the particular case in this paper.  The firm invests in only two 
                                                          
3  This formulation abstracts from the firm’s financial decision regarding the source of funds for new 
investment.  It assumes that investment is funded out of retained earnings rather than by issuing new debt 
or equity. 
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types of capital:  productive capital (Kp) and pollution abatement capital (Ka).  It is 
assumed, as in past literature (Conrad and Morrison, 1985, and Wilcoxen, 1990), that 
pollution abatement capital serves only as means of complying with regulation.  To the 
firm, it has no other value.  This implies that ∂π/∂Ka is, by definition, equal to zero.  
From 1.4, it is observed that this also implies that λa is zero.  So, for example, a firm will 
not buy a scrubber unless it needs it to comply with regulation.  Instead, investment in 
abatement capital will be treated as exogenously decided by the regulator.5  This leaves 
the following set of first order conditions:   
 
(1.6)                                                       
p
p
Kp I
P ∂
∂−= πλ  
(1.7)                 ∫ ∂
∂= ∞ +−
0
))(( dte
K
tJtR
p
p
pδπλ  
(1.8)                 pppp KIK δ−=
•
 
 
From equation 1.7, it is apparent that  λp  can be interpreted as the present value of the 
sum over time of marginal products accrued by adding a unit of Kp.  Furthermore, the 
right hand side of 1.6 can be interpreted as the marginal cost of investing in an additional 
unit of productive capital: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4  For a detailed description of this process, see Appendix A.  
5  aaaa KIK δ−=
•
  However, since  Ia  is exogenous,  Ka  is effectively exogenous. 
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(1.9)                                             
p
p
Kp I
Pmc ∂
∂−≡ π  
 
With convex adjustment costs,  the effect on current profits of an increase in investment 
(∂π/∂Ip) is negative, so the marginal cost of Kp is greater than its purchase price. 
 
This allows for the isolation of the effect of abatement investment on productive 
investment.  Substituting 1.9 into 1.6 and making use of the implicit function theorem to 
take the derivative of  Ip  with respect to  Ia  produces the following: 
 
(1.10)                                             










∂
∂−∂
∂
∂
∂−∂
∂
−=
p
p
p
p
a
p
a
p
a
p
I
mc
I
I
mc
I
dI
dI
λ
λ
   
 
Firms are assumed to be price takers, and λp is assumed to be independent of investment. 
That is, λp may change over time, but at any given time  t, the firm takes it as given. 
 
Thus, 1.10 reduces to the following expression: 
 
(1.11)                                                  










∂
∂
∂∂
∂
−=
p
ap
a
p
I
II
dI
dI
2
2
2
π
π
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As explained earlier, a special case is where a firm's adjustment costs depend only on the 
total amount of investment, and not on the composition of the investment.  In that case, 
dIp/dIa ≡ -1 and productive investment is crowded out by abatement investment on a one-
to-one basis, as assumed by previous literature.  However, a more likely scenario is one 
where adjustment costs do indeed depend on the composition of the investment, such as 
through economies of scope in the installation of abatement equipment.  This makes both 
the sign and the magnitude of  dIp/dIa theoretically indeterminate. 
 
3.  The Econometric Model 
In order to proceed, a model that can be estimated econometrically must be developed.  
This forces some assumptions to be made about the form of the firm's profit function.  
The firm is assumed to be a price taker, to produce under a constant returns to scale 
production function, and to face adjustment costs in the form of convex installation costs 
for new capital.  Thus the short run profit function can be specified as follows: 
 
(1.12)                                    ( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( )pK I W W K W Iπ σ ρ φ= −  
 
where σ(W) is a homogenous vector function of prices and wages and can be thought of 
as the marginal returns of each type of capital,  ρ(W) is the vector of installation prices of 
new capital, a homogeneous vector function of prices and wages, φ(I) is a convex vector 
function of  I  that captures the effects of adjustment costs.      
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As is common in q-theoretic investment literature (Summers, 1981, Blanchard and 
Fischer, 1989, and Wilcoxen, 1990), I assume that φ(I)  can be approximated by the 
following quadratic form: 6  
 
(1.13)                                               IIII Γ++= '')( γαφ  
 
Where  γ  is an unknown vector and  Γ  is an unknown matrix of parameters whose 
elements correspond to the two types of capital.  
 
Now, substituting 1.12 into 1.1 allows the firm's first order conditions to be rewritten as 
follows: 
 
(1.14)                                                  
p
p
Kp I
IWP ∂
∂+= )()( φρλ  
(1.15)             ∫ ∂
∂= ∞ +−
0
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K
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p
p
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(1.16)                   pppp KIK δ−=
•
 
 
Since a functional form for φ(I) has been assumed, ∂φ(I)/∂Ip can be calculated: 
                                                          
6 Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) suggest that the quadratic form for adjustment costs is an 
oversimplification, and that "lumpy" or asymmetric functions should be used.  For tractability, however, the 
commonly-used quadratic form is also used here.  
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(1.17)     aIappIppp
pI
I Γ+Γ+=∂
∂ 22)( γφ  
Where Γpp and Γap are elements of matrix Γ.7  
Now, substituting 1.17 into 1.14 produces first-order conditions of the form: 
 
(1.18)                                          )22)(( aIappIpppWP
p
Kp Γ+Γ++= γρλ  
(1.19)             ∫ ∂
∂= ∞ +−
0
))(( dte
K
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p
p
pδπλ  
(1.20)                   pppp KIK δ−=
•
 
 
Following the previous logic, this implies that the firm's marginal cost of productive 
investment is: 
 
(1.21)                                   )22)(( aappppp
p
kp IIWPmc Γ+Γ++= γρ   
 
Setting marginal cost equal to marginal revenue (λp) and solving for Ip yields: 
 
(1.22)                                    ( )1 1
( )
ap
p k ap p
pp pp
I P I
W
γρ λ
Γ = − − − Γ Γ   
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This suggests that the effect of abatement investment on productive investment can be 
found by estimating the sign and magnitude of  Γap/Γpp.  This is confirmed by making use 
of the implicit function theorem on 1.21 to find dIp/dIa.   
 
(1.23)     
pp
ap
a
p
dI
dI
Γ
Γ−=  
 
The sign of 1.23 will be telling.  Since adjustment costs are assumed to be convex in  Ip, 
the sign of  Γpp  will be a priori positive.  Therefore,  Γap  must be negative if  dIp/dIa  is 
positive.  This could be interpreted as economies of scope in investment costs. 
 
Now, in order to estimate the model, data on Ip, Ia, λp, pkP , and  ρ(W) must be collected.  
The data for Ip, Ia, and pkP  are readily available at the two-digit industry level.  These 
data may be used to estimate 1.22 under the assumption that industries may be modelled 
as representative firms.  However,  λp  and  ρ(W)  are unobservable. 
 
To overcome the problem of an unobservable ρ(W), I assume the price of installation 
services to be constant relative to the GDP deflator.  This allows 1.22 to be rewritten in 
constant dollar terms for sector  i  at time  t: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 For detailed descriptions of this process see, Appendix B.  
  18
(1.24)                                      
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Where  Ip,  Ia,  λp, pkP ,  K and  ρ0 are expressed in constant dollar terms. 
 
To see how λp might be measured, past literature can be examined.  Hayashi (1982) used 
a restricted q-theoretic model to show that marginal q is equal to average q, and so 
subsequent q-theory literature has often used stock market indices as a proxy for marginal 
q.   The model discussed in this paper implies qp = λp/ pkP , so a determination of qp also 
determines λp.  However, using stock market indices as a general proxy for q is 
insufficient for this study. Since the model here has multiple firms and two types of 
capital, many average q's would need to be calculated.  Untangling stock market data to 
do this is nearly impossible because most firms produce many different types of products. 
 
This suggests that the λp in this model must be handled in another manner. Suppose that 
for a representative firm, or industry i, in year t, λp can be decomposed as follows: 
 
(1.25)     tp
i
p
it
p λλλ +=  
 
Where ipλ  varies across industries and tpλ  varies across time.   
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Further, to produce an estimable function, one more assumption must be made.  Ideally, 
given a larger data set, the parameters of φ(I), αi, γi, and Γi would be allowed to vary 
across industries without restriction.  This would be comprable to running OLS on each 
industry separately. However, to increase the power of estimation, I make the following 
assumption on how the parameters of the adjustment cost function vary across industries: 
 
(1.26a)   
 
(1.26b) 
 
(1.26c) 
 
Where iK is the average capital stock for a firm in industry i. 
Substituting 1.25 and 1.26 into 1.24 yields the following equation: 
 
(1.27)                     ( )
0 0
1 1( )p api iit t p t i itap p k p
pp pp pp pp
I P IK K
γ λ λρ ρ
Γ= − + − + −Γ Γ Γ Γ  
 
As is now apparent, the assumptions made in equations 1.25 and 1.26 make the empirical 
testing of the model more feasible in several ways.  First, separating λp into industry and 
time components allows the use of stock market data as proxies for time effects in the 
model.  Whereas stock market data are insufficient proxies for q when many firms are 
i
iK
αα =
i
iK
γγ =
i
iK
Γ=Γ
  20
represented, it is a suitable proxy for the time component of q.  For example, if the 
Standard & Poor’s index is particulary high in one year, it is likely the marginal value of 
capital is high in that year also.  Assuming K varies by industry but not by time allows it 
to be treated as an industry-specific effect.  Thus, the industry-specific and time-specific 
effects on all variables other than Ia are completely captured by running a pooled 
regression using the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) stock market index as a proxy for the time-
sensitive variables and including industry dummies.  Then the following model correctly 
captures the overall effect of abatement investment on productive investment:      
 
(1.28)                             itISPispIiap DDII εββββ ++++= ''10  
   
Where DI is a set of dummy variables for industries, and DISP = DI*(S&P)t and is a set of 
interactive dummy variables. The industry dummy is multiplied by the S&P stock index, 
normalized to 1982 dollars.  β0 is the estimated intercept and does not change relative to 
industry, time, or amount of abatement investment. β1 is the effect of abatement 
investment on productive investment. βi captures the industry-specific effect relative to 
the constant. βisp captures the time-specific effects for each industry.       
 
Equation 1.28 captures the common effect of Ia on Ip, but it constrains the effect to be 
equal across industries and time.  It is likely that the effect of Ia is different for each 
industry.  Furthermore, a new-source effect may cause the correlation between Ia and Ip to 
increase over time. When regulations were first enacted, investment in pollution 
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abatement equipment was primarily geared toward controlling emissions from sources 
already in place (and thus may have come at a cost to new productive investment).  
However, as this backlog is eliminated, and the firm begins to invest in new productive 
capital, it may find that new productive capital cannot be installed without the proper 
abatement equipment.  This would be expected to cause the correlation between Ia and Ip 
to increase over time. Up until 1980, nearly all abatement investment was applied to 
existing sources, so allowing the slope coefficients on Ia to change between the sub-
periods 1973-1979 and 1980-1993 can correct for the possible misspecification of 1.28. 
8,9, 10  Therfore, in order to capture the different effect Ia has on Ip across industries and 
across time, this paper also estimates:  
 
(1.29)                         εβββββ +++++= ∗ ISPispIiIIaiaip DDIDDII '210 '      
 
Where  IDIIa = Ia*DI  and is an industry dummy interactive with abatement investment, 
and D* = 1 for the period 1980-1993.  Therefore, the slope coefficient β2i is now relevant 
for the time period 1973-1979 and β1i picks up the difference in slope in each industry 
over the later sub-period.  Notice also that the base abatement investment variable is 
dropped.  This allows β2i  to be an estimate of the actual slope coefficient for each 
industry from 1973-1979.   
                                                          
8 The results of the likelihood ratio tests of the various constraints are discussed in the Section 5. 
9 It may be that the correlation is increasing over time due to reasons besides the new source effect. 
10 Cutoffs for every year were tested for a “kink” in the data.  D*=1 for 1980-1993 resulted in the highest 
value for the log likelihood function, making it the correct choice to test the significance of a regime 
change. 
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4.  The Data 
The pollution-abatement and productive capital investment are available for the sixteen 
manufacturing industries in Table 1.1.  The data are measured at the two-digit SIC-code 
level of aggregation. 
 
The data cover the time periods from 1973 to 1986 and 1988 to 1993 and are from the 
Census Bureau’s “Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures” study; data from 1987 is 
not available.11  The original data are for total capital investment and pollution-abatement 
capital investment (by industry and year) in current dollars.  Subtracting abatement 
investment from total investment creates the productive investment series.  The data are 
then converted to constant 1982 dollars using the price deflator for Producer’s Durable 
Equipment.    
 
 
Figure 1.1 shows the correlation coefficient between productive and abatement 
investment in each industry. From inspection of the chart, it is immediately apparent that 
twelve out of the sixteen industries show a positive correlation between abatement and 
productive investment. Eight of the industries have correlation coefficients greater than 
0.5.  Although this is far from being a robust statistical test, the chart suggests the 
possibility of an overall positive correlation between  Ia  and Ip.  However, the difference 
in correlation coefficients shows that the constrained model is most likely a 
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misspecification. 
 
Further analysis of the data can be performed by looking at the average amount of 
abatement investment as a percentage of total investment by each industry in Figure 1.2. 
 
Note several points from Figure 1.2.  First, in only five industries (paper, chemicals, 
petroleum refining, primary metals, and Transportation equipment) is abatement 
investment a substantial percentage of total investment (more than 6%).  Next, the 
investment activity across industries varies greatly.  This could be a possible source of 
heteroscedasticity.  Thus it becomes necessary to look at variance in  Ip  and  Ia  across 
industries. Figure 1.3 shows how variances differ across industries. 
 
It is obvious, on observation of Figure 1.3, that variances, especially in Ip, differ greatly 
across industries.  This suggests that a correction for heteroscedasticity is probably in 
order.  Indeed, using the Cook and Weisberg (1983) test for heteroscedasticity, the null 
hypothesis that Var(εit) = Var(Ip)I is rejected with more than 99% confidence (χ2(1) = 
67.22). 
 
It is also worthwhile to look at percentage change in productive and abatement 
investment over time in Figure 1.4. In observing this chart, no obvious pattern of 
investment growth can be ascertained.  That is, abatement investment does not 
                                                                                                                                                                             
11 The Census Bureau did not perform the census in 1987.  
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necessarily grow in the same years as productive investment.  The percentage changes in 
productive investment and abatement investment actually have opposite sign in 8 out of 
the 19 years.  Productive investment decreases in most years between 1976 and 1983, 
whereas abatement investment generally increases until 1981.  Both types of investment 
show a significant decrease in 1982 and 1983.  Furthermore, both types of investment 
generally increase between 1984 and 1992, except in 1986 and 1991, when abatement 
investment decreases.   This suggests that if a correlation between  Ia  and  Ip  exists, the 
coefficient does not remain constant over time and may be higher in the later sub-period.  
 
The pooled model has 320 observations.  Furthermore, in the two equations, 1.28 and 
1.29, 49 and 80 parameters need to be estimated, respectively.  It is prudent to worry 
about the small number of degrees of freedom.  With the pooled model, however, I 
maximize the degrees of freedom for the data that are available.  Furthermore, as will be 
apparent in Section 5, the results are surprisingly robust.   
 
5.  Empirical Results and Implications 
Equations 1.28 and 1.29 are estimated while correcting for heteroscedasticity12 using a 
pooled GLS estimator.  Cross-sectional correlations were all assumed to be zero.  A 
likelihood ratio test was performed to test the restrictions imposed in 1.28.  The null 
hypothesis that the effect of abatement investment is the same across industries and the 
                                                          
12 To correct for the heteroscedasticity, the estimated variances can be written in the general form:       
(X’X)-1XWX(X’X)-1, where iiiii
xxW εε'Σ=    
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two time periods is rejected with greater than 99% confidence (χ2(31) = 204.83).13  The 
results for 1.29 are shown in Table 1.2. 
 
The dummy variables for industry 22 are omitted to avoid collininearity, so values of the 
industry dummy coefficients are relative to the constant.   A Wald statistic is calculated to 
test the joint significance of the dummy variables.  The null hypothesis that they are not 
jointly significant is easily rejected (W≈χ2(31) = 737.08).  Separately, the null hypothesis 
that the S&P interactive dummies and the industry dummies are each jointly insignificant 
is also rejected (W≈χ2(16) = 85.83, and W≈χ2(15) = 519.40, respectively). 
 
As expected due to the new source effect, the coefficient on  Ia  is increasing 
significantly for more than half of the industries.  Nine (food, paper, printing, chemicals, 
petroleum, primary metals, machinery, electrical machinery, and instruments) of the 
sixteen industries have positive, significant  β1i  coefficients.  So, for these industries, the 
effect of abatement investment on productive investment is significantly greater between 
1980 and 1993 than between 1973 and 1979, when abatement investment was typically 
applied existing sources.    
 
More interestingly, however, is the fact that the coefficient on abatement investment is 
both positive and significant for three (lumber, chemicals, and primary metals) of the 16 
                                                          
13 The most general model, with the effect of abatement investment varying over time and industry is also 
tested against other restricted/nested models:  one where the effects vary over time, but not industry, and 
one where the effects vary by industry, but not time.  In both cases, the restrictions are rejected.   
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industries.14  This suggests that, in these three industries, rather than crowd out 
productive investment, investment in pollution control capital actually stimulates it.   
 
To analyze this result, recall that the coefficient on  Ia  is  –(Γap/Γpp).  Since the estimated 
coefficient is both positive and significant, either  Γap  or  Γpp  must be negative.  As 
discussed earlier, if adjustment costs are convex in  Ip,  then  Γpp  must be positive.  
Therefore, Γap must be negative.  This suggests that it costs less to invest in productive 
capital and abatement capital together than it does to invest in each separately.  Or, 
equivalently, there are economies of scope when abatement investment and productive 
investment are done together. 
 
This result, although surprising at first, has a rather intuitive explanation.  Suppose that, 
as is often true, installing pollution-control equipment forces a temporary shutdown of 
part or all of the facility.  Thus the shutdown for installation of abatement capital may 
also allow productive equipment to be replaced or renovated at a relatively small 
additional cost.  Thus, a firm would want to invest relatively heavily in productive capital 
whenever it is forced to install pollution abatement equipment. 
 
Only the food and instruments industries have a significantly negative coefficient on 
                                                          
14 It is worth noting that two of the industries (chemicals and  primary metals) with positive, significant  Ia  
coefficients are ones listed earlier as having a significant percentage of their investment in abatement 
equipment.  This might mean that economies of scope are only realized in industries investing heavily in 
abatement equipment.  However, the industry hit hardest by the regulations, and having the highest 
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abatement investment.  Of the remaining 11 industries, 7 have mean coefficients below 
zero and 4 have mean coefficients above zero.  Due to the fact that the data set is 
relatively small, the standard errors on these estimates large and they cannot be 
distinguished as significantly different from zero.  Figure 1.5 shows where the means and 
the 95% confidence intervals lie for each industry.   
 
From Table 1.2 and Figure 1.5, it apparent that each industry reacts somewhat differently 
to federally mandated pollution abatement investment.  Surprisingly, there is only 
evidence of a significantly negative effect on productive investment in 2 out of the 
sixteen industries.  Thus it is now apparent that an a priori assumption of crowding out 
between abatement and productive investment is incorrect.  In fact, in some industries, 
there is evidence of economies of scope between the two types of investment.    
 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
The results in this paper show clearly that productive investment is not crowded out by 
investment in pollution abatement capital in all industries.  For the lumber, chemicals, 
and primary metals industries, in fact, it is safe to say that pollution abatement investment 
actually stimulates productive investment.  This result suggests economies of scope for 
investing in the two types of capital at the same time.  Furthermore, the results give 
empirical support to the Porter’s hypothesis and observation (1995) that firms tend to 
renovate when faced with environmental regulation.      
                                                                                                                                                                             
percentage of investment in abatement equipment, the petroleum industry, as well as the paper industry, 
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The results are even stronger in light of the assumption that λ is unaffected by investment 
in abatement equipment.  General equilibrium effects cause both interest rates and the 
price of capital goods to rise when firms demand abatement capital ( Wilcoxen, 1988).  
These effects unambiguously lead to a reduction in productive investment.  Therefore, by 
ignoring them, the observed results are actually biased away from showing a positive 
correlation between abatement and productive investment.   
 
Some caveats must be kept in mind.  With data aggregated to the 2-digit level, it is 
impossible to see exactly what is happening at the plant or firm level.  Regional factors 
also cannot be observed.  This makes it difficult to say exactly what the mechanism is 
that drives the correlation.  It is possible that industries with a few dirty plants located in 
heavily regulated areas may have closed those plants and opened new plants in different 
locations.  This would cause a large, positive correlation between abatement and 
productive investment at the industry level.  That phenomenon would be consistent with 
basic observation that abatement investment may stimulate productive investment but the 
mechanism would not be economies of scope in investment.  
 
Despite the caveats, the results remain very interesting.  At the industry level, abatement 
policy does not seem to crowd out otherwise productive investment in all industries.  On 
the contrary, abatement investment seems to provide an incentive in some industries (via 
                                                                                                                                                                             
have mean estimates negative and relatively close to zero, but insignificant at the 95% confidence level.   
  29
economies of scope) for firms to renovate sooner, and in greater quantities than they 
normally would.  (This does not necessarily imply that individual firms are made better 
off by regulation, just that in aggregate, their investment rises.)  Furthermore, the results 
show that care must be taken when designing policy affecting a large, aggregate branch 
of the economy.  Since industries react to mandated abatement investment differently, the 
effect on investment in the productive capital stock of such regulation should be 
calculated separately for each industry.       
     
These results have implications beyond the range of this paper.  Finding economies of 
scope between other investment pairs will have strong implications for policies designed 
to alter the composition of total investment.  In fact, it would be surprising if other types 
of investment did not interact in the adjustment cost function.  
  30
 
Chapter II 
Considering Harvest Percentage in a Forest with Standing Value:  
Using Two-Part Tax Instruments to Capture External Benefits Derived 
from Forest Density and Rotation Time 
 
 
1. Introductory Remarks and Review of the Relevant Literature 
 
Chapter II extends current forestry literature by allowing the forest planner and private 
landowner to choose not only the rotation time, but also how many trees per acre to cut.  
Many forest amenities are derived not only from the age of the trees, but also from the 
density of the forest.  In the case of some forest externalities such as erosion control, it is 
possible that the clear-cutting of a forest might result in much larger damages than would 
occur with selective cutting.  
 
 The regulation of the percentage of trees cut per acre may dampen some of the 
externality paths and thus avert such disasters as the one experienced in Portland, Oregon 
in 1995. Massive landslides, occurring mostly in areas of clear-cutting, contaminated the 
entire city’s water supply and caused millions of dollars of damage.  The damage was so 
great that in a recent election, Oregonians were asked to vote on a referendum that would 
have banned clear-cutting completely.  Furthermore, the immense, costly forest fires 
occurring all over the Western U.S. in 2002 make it obvious that letting forests grow 
without management can be as bad as clear-cutting.  Therefore, on forest lands that are in 
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danger of falling victim to a wildfire and would not otherwise be logged, it may be 
prudent to provide a firm with incentive to harvest some percentage significantly greater 
than zero.  In either case, the consideration of harvest percentage is an important part of 
forest management and has been ignored by the forest economics literature thus far.      
 
This paper focuses on the case where a logging firm does not internalize the benefits 
from leaving some trees uncut and therefore chooses to clear-cut.  I present a pair of tax 
instruments that could optimally control clear-cutting rather than banning it completely. 
 
Section 2 of this paper briefly revisits the basic Faustmann and Samuelson models of 
optimal forest management, then introduces a new model that allows a social planner to 
choose both the optimal rotation period and the optimal amount of forest thinning.   
Section 3 sets up the private landowner’s problem and includes taxes aimed at controlling 
both rotation time and thinning.  I solve the social and private problems, then solve for 
the optimal tax instruments.   Section 4 shows the results of a numerical analysis on a 
simple stylized case.  
 
 
2. Fuastmann, Samuelson, and Beyond 
Before jumping into a more general model, this section presents a brief overview of the 
classical Faustmann and Samuelson models.   
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2.1 The Faustmann Model 
The Faustmann model solves for the optimal rotation period of a forest that will be 
harvested forever. Initially, the land is bare with timber production as its only use.  The 
landowner chooses the rotation period  T  to maximize the following private value 
function: 
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where  G(T)  is the net timber value of the stand at time  T,  and  r  is the interest rate.  
The numerator can be thought of as the present net value of the stand that will be 
harvested at  T .  The denominator is simply the result of summing over an infinite series 
of identical rotations.  
 
Taking the derivative with respect to the rotation length and rearranging, the following 
first order condition is derived: 
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where the left hand side of the equation is the growth rate of the forest in terms of net 
value.  So a rational landowner will cut down all the trees and replant when the growth 
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rate equals the interest rate multiplied by a discount factor. 
 
2.2 Samuelson:  Forest Planner Problem, Externalities Included 
Following Samuelson (1976), I introduce an externalities function, in which the 
externality varies with the age of the forest, into the forest planner’s problem.  The social 
value (SV) function can now be written the following way: 
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where  G(T)  is again the net timber value at age  T, and  F(t)  is a function giving the 
externalities generated by the forest at each point in time.  The integral gives the present 
value of a stream of non-timber benefits coming from the standing forest.  Thus I have 
society’s total benefit from the forest, summed over an infinite series of rotations. 
 
The time path of the benefits flowing from a standing forest is controversial. A wide 
literature assumes  F(t)  increases with the age of the trees at a decreasing rate (Hartman, 
1976, Strang, 1983, and Snyder and Bhattacharyya, 1990).  If this is the case, the 
externality function is monotonically increasing, and it will always be optimal 
(disregarding the timber value) to let the forest grow.  Even though this case may be the 
most likely, it is not the most general case.  Calish et. al. (1978) show that, depending on 
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the forest, the externality function could take any number of shapes, including a non-
monotonic one. Englin and Klan (1990) assume only that  F(t)  is either increasing at a 
decreasing rate or increasing and then, at some point, decreasing.  In this case, the 
externality function, at some time  tFmax  begins to decrease, and it will be optimal (again 
disregarding timber value) to harvest the forest at some time less than infinity.  Therefore, 
conceptually, the externality may “favor” either older trees or younger trees.  Since this 
paper’s main focus is on thinning practices, and a planner would actually want to force a 
firm to decrease their rotation period in relatively few cases, I assume F(t)  is increasing 
and concave over the relevant range of time.   
 
Now, maximizing SV in equation 2.3 with respect to the rotation length and rearranging, 
the first order condition can be written as: 15 
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Thus, the social planner will allow cutting when the growth rate of the forest in net 
timber value is equal to a discount factor plus the “externalities balance” divided by  
                                                          
15 Using 2.4, the second order condition reduces to 
•••• <+ )()()( TGrTGTF    
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G(T), the timber value at  T .16  The externalities balance is the present value of the 
difference between the forest benefits available at the end of the rotation period,  F )(T , 
and the stream of benefits available from the growing forest throughout the rotation 
period.  Whether the optimal rotation time is shorter or longer than it would be without 
externalities depends on the sign of the second term on the right hand side.  Furthermore, 
the sign of this term depends on the time path of the externality function.  The externality 
favors old trees, for example, if there is a positive difference between the amenity value 
at  T  and the amenity value at  t, for all  t, summed over the rotation period. For the 
purposes of this paper, as stated above, this is the case examined here. I assume that for 
all t < T, F(T) >F(t).  This implies that consideration of the externality increases the 
optimal rotation time.  
 
The private landowner who does not internalize the externality will not choose the 
socially optimal rotation period.  Thus the need for corrective regulation or tax 
instruments arises.   
 
2.3  Beyond Faustmann and Samuelson:  Allowing for Forest Thinning and Rotation 
Timing 
To capture the effects of the density of trees left standing after each rotation, as well as 
the rotation period on forest amenities, I add two major features to the previous model.  
First, I allow the forest planner or the private landowner to choose not only when to cut, 
                                                          
16 Note, at this point, as in previous literature, clear-cutting is assumed. 
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but also what percentage of trees per acre to harvest.  This additional choice is important, 
since many forest amenities such as erosion control are directly related to the remaining 
density of the forest.  It may not be optimal to let the external benefit reach zero, as 
would be the case with a clear-cut.  This is especially true when the positive externality is 
control of a potential disaster, such as a flood or massive erosion.  Second, the externality 
function, the private gross revenues and costs, and the timber value of the forest are 
allowed to be functions of the harvest percentage as well as the forest’s age.   
 
The forest planner again maximizes the sum of the timber and non-timber benefits of the 
forest over an infinite number of identical rotations.  The value function can be written as 
follows: 
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Note the difference between this expression and equation 2.4.  Now the forest externality 
is both a function of age  t  and the percentage of trees harvested per acre H. 17  The path 
of F(t,H) with respect to t  has been discussed in detail above.  With respect to H, I 
assume the external benefit decreases as the harvest percentage per acre increases. 18  The 
net timber value, G(T,H),  is also an increasing function of both  T  and  H.  Since the 
forest planner must now make two choices, the optimization problem produces two first 
                                                          
17By definition,  0 ≥ H  ≥ 1.   H  = 1 would be a clear-cut. 
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order conditions:  one describing the optimal rotation time and the other describing the 
optimal percentage of trees harvested per acre.  These first order conditions are:   
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Equation 2.6 gives the conditions for optimal rotation time given a certain percentage of 
trees cut per acre.  The social planner, as in the Samuelson model, will allow harvest 
when the growth rate of the forest in net timber value is equal to a discount factor plus the 
externalities balance divided by the timber value at  T when the harvest fraction is H. 
 
Equation 2.7 gives the first order condition for the optimal percentage of trees harvested 
per acre given a certain rotation period T.  The social planner will choose H such that the 
marginal net timber value with respect to  H  is equal to the marginal value of the lost 
forest amenity with respect to  H.  Intuitively, the social benefits of a marginal increase in  
H  must equal the social costs of a marginal increase in  H. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
18 Recall that the externality is a positive one, an amenity.  As the firm increases  H, for example,  the 
chance the forest will prevent a landslide decreases.   
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3. Private Optimization, Taxation, and Socially Optimal Outcomes  
This section examines the private logging firm’s problem, where the firm faces taxes 
aimed at controlling both the percentage of trees cut on each acre and rotation time.  If it 
were feasible to implement, a Pigovian tax or subsidy on the externality would be a direct 
way to force the firm to internalize the externality and could induce optimal behavior in 
both choices.  However, a Pigovian tax or subsidy is not feasible in this case.  If the 
externality in question were erosion control, for example, a tax on the amount of dirt that 
travels from one acre to the next, or into a stream, is unrealistic.  The observation of such 
an externality, and enforcement of the tax, would be very difficult if not impossible. 
 
It is much simpler to tax the market transactions and suboptimal behavior of which the 
externality is a symptom. In the following analysis I consider two tax instruments.  One is 
a flat, lump-sum licensing fee (τLS), collected at harvest time.19 I also consider an 
additional “clear-cut” tax (τCC), assumed to be levied on the firm’s fraction of trees 
harvested per acre.  The number of trees that can be planted on an acre is assumed to be 
fixed.20  Although not a tax on a direct market transaction, and therefore raising some 
observation and enforcement problems, the clear-cut tax is still simpler to implement than 
the Pigovian tax.  Enforcing the tax will require someone to physically observe each site 
                                                          
19 To control for rotation period alone, Englin and Klan suggest the use of existing tax instruments such as a 
property tax, a severance tax, or a yield tax.  While these existing, market-based instruments are interesting 
and intuitive tools that can be used to correct for a sub-optimal rotation period, it can be shown that they 
will not work in combination with the clear-cut tax to correct for both harvest percentage and rotation time.      
  39
to make sure firms are: (1) cutting down less than 100% of the trees in an area and (2) are 
actually “thinning” the forest; that they are not simply leaving  part of each acre 
populated and clear-cutting the rest.  However, these actions are relatively easy to 
observe.   
 
Since the firm can choose both the rotation period and the percentage of trees it harvests, 
and a Pigovian subsidy is unrealistic, a single instrument cannot, in general, control both 
choices.  I analyze the case where the clear-cut tax, combined with the licensing fee can 
correct the market failure when a logging firm clear-cuts and harvests sooner than 
socially optimal.  I characterize the optimal percentage of trees harvested and rotation 
time, then analyze how the decisions are affected by the two-part instrument.  Finally, I 
solve for the optimal rates of tax.  Furthermore, I analyze the proper application of the tax 
instrument to forests with different growth and externality characteristics.  
 
3.1  Private Optimization (All Taxes Included) 
For convenience of interpretation, I define the following functions:  
 
(2.8)    )()()( tgtntb =       
 
where n(t)  is the number of trees,  g(t)  is the timber volume of a tree at any given time.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
20 The policy maker would have to consider the species of tree being planted.  A different number of trees 
could be planted per acre, depending on the species.  Furthermore, different forest types will have a 
different optimal percentage of uncut trees. 
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Thus  b(t) can be interpreted as the timber volume of the growing trees in the stand at any 
given time.  The timber volume is assumed to be monotonically increasing for all  t.  
Although the number of trees will decrease over time, each tree grows fast enough keep 
the volume of timber increasing.  
 
To implement the taxes properly, a functional form for the timber value of the forest,  
G(T,H), must be specified.  Let G be broken down into net revenues and costs so that  
G(T,H) = pHb(T) -c, where p  is the price of timber net of an per unit harvest costs, and  c  
is a fixed lump-sum harvest and replant cost.21   The intuition behind specifying c as a 
fixed cost is that firms must rent a certain amount of equipment and labor to harvest each 
acre regardless of the harvest percentage; marginal costs, if any, will be captured in  p.   
The term  pHb(T)   can be interpreted as the value of the growing trees at time  T.   Now it 
is possible to define the firm’s profit function, net of taxes, at the time of harvest: 
 
(2.9)   )()(),( HcTpHbHT CCLS θττπ −−−=     
 
The actual penalty incurred from the clear-cut tax is the tax rate, τCC , multiplied by θ(H),  
an increasing, convex function of  H.  This allows the instrument to take the form of a 
continuously graduated tax if desired by the planner.    
  
The private landowner chooses  T  and  H  to maximize the following value function:   
                                                          
21 This basic methodology follows Englin and Klan (1990) 
  41
 
(2.10)   rT
rT
eHT
e
HTPV −−−
= ),(
1
1),( π      
 
Notice that the private firm does not internalize the externality.  The left-hand side of the 
equation simply reflects the fact that this private value function depends on  T  and  H. 
 
Maximizing over the rotation period and percentage of trees cut yields the following first 
order conditions: 
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Equation 2.11 shows that the firm will harvest when the benefit of a marginal increase in  
T  equals the discounted net profit gained by harvesting at time  T.  Equation 2.12 shows 
that the firm will choose an  H  such that the net gains in increasing  the harvest 
percentage are equal to zero.  With fixed costs and no taxes the firm will arrive at a 
corner solution, where  H = 1.          
 
Plugging the profit function and the proper partial derivates into 2.11 and 2.12 yields: 
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The intuition for 2.13 and 2.14 is similar to that for the previous two equations.  The 
intuition for 2.12 may be somewhat clearer now, as it is apparent that with constant costs 
and no tax, an internal solution for H  does not exist.     
 
3.2  The Growth Function, Externalities, and the Effect of Clear-cutting 
Before I launch into the case where the clear-cut tax is used in combination with the lump 
sum licensing fee, it will be helpful to re-examine the possible forest characteristics that 
might influence the optimal tax combinations as well as the magnitude of the actual effect 
once the taxes are implemented. 
 
Before the planner arrives, the private landowner is clear-cutting and harvesting the trees 
sooner each period than is optimal.  I make no prior restrictions on the magnitude of the 
effects of  H  and  T  on the externality, only on the sign.  H  may  have a large effect on 
the externality in question, as it would be in the case of erosion control on a steep slope, 
or in the preservation of a species habitat. Or the effect may be a small one, as might be 
the case if the forest is used for hiking. Furthermore, I make no assumption as to the rate 
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of growth of the forest.  Thus, in the following section I show how the two-part 
instrument can be used to decrease a firm’s harvest percentage and rotation period under 
fairly general conditions. 
 
3.3  Two Part Instrument: Clear-cut Tax and Lump Sum Licensing Fee 
Differentiating 2.13 with respect to  τLS  yields the effect of the yield tax on the optimal 
private rotation period:    
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Differentiating 2.13 with respect to  τCC  yields the effect of the clear-cut tax on T*:    
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A positive lump sum tax and a clear cut tax will both lengthen the rotation period.   This 
is because both taxes must be paid at the harvest date.  A competitive private owner will 
want to let the trees mature longer in order to reduce the frequency at which the fees must 
be paid.  Since both taxes serve to lengthen the optimal rotation period, the effect of the 
two-part instrument, where both taxes are positive, is to unambiguously lengthen rotation 
time. It is also possible that a properly-set subsidy-tax instrument could be used to arrive 
at the optimal  T.   
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Differentiating 2.13 with respect to  τLS  yields the effect of the lump sum licensing fee on 
H*:    
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Differentiating 2.13 with respect to  τCC  yields the effect of the clear-cut tax on H*:    
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The licensing fee has no effect on the optimal harvest percentage.  This is expected: the 
licensing fee penalizes the firm a fixed amount every rotation, but does not penalize it 
based on how much it harvests.  The effect of the clear-cut tax depends upon the marginal 
penalty received for cutting  H.  Assuming θ(H) is increasing in  H  means the tax 
decreases the optimal harvest percentage.  Further, the net effect of the two-tax 
instrument on  H  is negative when both taxes are positive.  The policy always decreases 
the privately-optimal density of cut. 
 
Note that while the clear-cut tax affects both  H  and  T,  the licensing fee only affects  T.  
This is both an interesting and useful result.  A planner wanting to control for harvest 
percentage can set  τCC  to arrive at the optimal  H and then use τLS  to fine tune the 
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timing of each harvest.  If the effect of  H  on the externality is sufficiently large to 
produce the need for a large clear-cut tax, inducing an inefficiently long rotation period, 
τLS  can take the form of a subsidy.        
 
Setting private first–order conditions equal to social first-order conditions, I solve for the 
optimal tax rates: 
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These tax rates make the private first order conditions match the socially optimal first 
order conditions.  Assuming F(t, H) decreases in  H, the optimal clear cut tax rate  always 
positive.  The optimal tax rate increases as the effect of  H  on the externality increases.22  
For example, if the externality is erosion control, the clear cut tax would necessarily be 
higher for firms harvesting on sloped landscapes, or above a populated area or water 
source.  Intuitively, the clear-cut tax rate decreases as the tax penalty becomes more 
convex. 
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The sign and magnitude of the lump sum licensing fee depends upon the growth rate of 
the value of the externality and  τCC.   The lump sum fee will be positive if: 
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or, inserting the optimal  τCC: 
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If the value of the externality grows slowly throughout the rotation, the licensing fee is 
likely to be positive and large.  Alternatively, if the value of the externality grows rapidly 
with the age of the forest, as in the case of erosion control, the licensing fee is more likely 
to be small, or take the form of a subsidy.23   Furthermore, if the social value of the forest 
is very sensitive to thinning, requiring a large clear-cut tax, the planner may need to 
subsidize the firm each rotation.  A large τCC  may give the firm the incentive to wait 
longer to harvest than is optimal.  The proper lump sum subsidy would correct the 
inefficiency. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
22 Alternatively, if  F(t, H)  is decreasing in  H, as would be the case forest was otherwise unprofitable to 
harvest and the externality was fire control, the clear-cut tax takes the form of a subsidy.  The subsidy 
increases as  the effect of  H  on the externality increases.     
23 For example, if erosion control is the externality, the value of  F(t, H) increases very quickly during the 
first 10 to 15 years of the rotation, as the trees develop mature root systems, and increases very little 
thereafter.  
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In summary, the clear-cut tax affects both harvest percentage per acre and rotation 
timing.  However, the tax alone induces the optimal harvest percentage, but in almost 
every case causes the firm’s rotation period to be too short or too long.  Therefore the 
second part of the two-part instrument, the lump sum licensing fee or subsidy, is needed 
to correct for the inefficient rotation period.   
         
4.  A Simple Numerical Example   
So far the model has been very general and has been applicable to a wide range of cases.   
I now present a more specific numerical model in order to explore in more detail the 
optimal tax rates under different conditions. This section describes a very simple, but 
intuitive, stylized example where the clear-cut tax and lump sum tax are implemented. 
 
For the numerical example, I assume a specific form for the for the externality function,  
F(H, T).  The assumed function is shown below and defines the instantaneous value of 
the amenity for any  H  and  t: 
 
(2.23)     )()()1(),( 22 tbHbHHtF γγ +∞−=      
    
Where  γ  is the dollar value of the amenity per unit of forest biomass.  The first term on 
the right hand side of the equation can be interpreted as the amenity value of the trees that 
have been left uncut and have reached peak volume.  The second term is the amenity 
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value of the growing trees that have been replanted since the previous harvest.  Squaring 
the harvest fraction puts more weight on the value of the fully grown trees.  This 
approximates the case where the concern is soil erosion.  As the harvested portion of the 
forest grows back, the new trees will develop root systems and eventually aid in the 
reduction of erosion.  However, since trees are typically harvested long before they are 
full grown, it is the uncut trees, with fully developed root systems, that will produce the 
most erosion control. 
 
For simplicity,  p  is assumed to be net of all costs.  
 
Under these assumptions the new first order conditions for a social optimum become: 
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The first order condition for the optimal rotation period depends linearly on γ  and  H, 
and  H  depends inversely on  γ.  Inserting the condition for the optimal harvest 
percentage into 2.24 shows that the optimal rotation period does not depend on  γ: 
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For a given  H,  γ  increases the optimal rotation period.  However,  γ   also decreases the 
optimal  H.  These effects cancel out exactly and the optimal  T  is left unaffected by  γ.   
The tax on the harvest fraction will not affect the firm’s decision on rotation length.  
 
From 2.25, it is apparent that an internal solution, 0 <  H  < 1, will exist if: 
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This is true for a sufficiently small  p  or  sufficiently large  γ. 
 
I assume that the clear-cut tax is levied on the square of H: θ(H )= H2.  This penalizes the 
firm relatively more for a harvest percentage closer to 100%.  This reflects the idea that 
the planner is more concerned with reducing the amount of clear-cutting and cares less if 
the firm harvests a small fraction of the trees. 
 
The stylized function used for the biomass of trees in board feet,  b(T), is based on data 
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published by Richard MacArdle (1961) for Douglas Fir.24  The estimated function is:    
 
(2.28)   35))-(-0.2(Te1
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The function is plotted in Figure 2.1.  The biomass of this particular stand peaks at 
25,000 board feet per acre and reaches this peak at a stand age of 70 years.25     
 
The price of a board foot is taken from Calish et. al. (1978) and transformed in the year 
2000 dollars.  In the model  p =  $2.03. 
 
The model is implemented in the Ox programming language (Doornik, 1999).  T   and  H  
are solved for simultaneously using the conditions above with the estimated parameters 
inserted.  When the real interest rate is assumed to be 3% and  γ  is assumed equal to 
$0.02, the Faustmann privately optimal rotation period (ignoring the externality) is 41.6 
years. 26  If the externality is considered, the optimal rotation period is 42.4 years and the 
optimal percentage of trees harvested per acre is 55%.  The optimal clear-cut tax is 
$37,444 per square fraction of each acre for a total penalty of $11,327 per acre.  The 
optimal lump sum payment per rotation period turns out be a subsidy of $8,891 in this 
                                                          
24 The MacArdle (1961) data counts the amount of wood available from root to tip of each tree.  Although a 
good estimate of the wood available to a pulp and paper firm, it does not provide an estimate of the wood 
available to be used as lumber.  Thus, using the MacArdle data as a reference, the “stylized” biomass 
estimation captures roughly the growth in mass of the wood available for lumber.    
25 Obviously, trees will continue to grow past 70 years, but this model assumes that the wood useable for 
lumber will reach near maximum volume by 70 years. 
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case.  Before taxes, the firm makes a gross profit of $22,822 per acre.  The firm makes an 
after-tax net profit of $20,302 per acre. 
 
Thus, as predicted by the general theoretical model, it is possible that the lump sum 
licensing fee will take the form of a subsidy in order to correct for the heavy clear-cut tax 
necessary to reach the optimal harvest percentage.  In the case above, the firm is charged 
a clear-cut penalty that is nearly half of its gross revenue on timber.  Furthermore, the 
firm is harvesting half of the lumber it would harvest in the absence of the tax.  
Therefore, to reach the optimal rotation time and make up for the clear-cut penalty that 
induces the optimal harvest percentage but misses the optimal rotation time, the firm 
must be subsidized each rotation period. 
 
To better illustrate this point, the model can be run under the previous parameter settings 
but with the tax rates set to incorrect values.  For example, the lump sum tax can be set to 
zero and the clear-cut tax rate held at what was optimal in the previous example 
($37,444/acre).  Under this tax schedule, the firm will choose a rotation period of 46 
years and a harvest percentage of 61%.  Thus the firm lets the trees grow for four years 
longer than is socially optimal, and because of the longer rotation period, the firm 
harvests 11% more trees than is optimal in order to maximize net profits.  Without the 
corrective lump sum subsidy, the logging firm will harvest too much, too late.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
26 This is a point of reference only.  In reality, as in the rest of the analysis, these parameter values will 
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To evaluate the sensitivity of the model to the assumptions about r and γ, the model was 
run with a range of values to see how changes in those parameters affect the results.  The 
effects of changing the discount rate, holding  γ  constant, on the optimal rotation period 
and harvest percentage are shown in Figure 2.2.  The optimal harvest percentage 
decreases fairly rapidly as the discount rate increases. If the discount rate is high, the 
present value of the amenities a tree generates (which begin flowing immediately) will 
outweigh the present value of harvesting the tree at the end of each period--the amenity is 
worth relatively more when the discount rate is higher.   Although  T  is not affected by 
the externality, it is affected by the discount rate.  It is apparent from the figure that the 
higher the discount rate is, the shorter the rotation period.   If the firm’s revenue stream is 
discounted at a higher rate, it will harvest sooner.  The decision to harvest a certain 
percentage of trees is more sensitive to changes in the discount rate than is the decision 
on the optimal rotation period.  With a discount rate of  7%, as suggested by the Office of 
Management and Budget (1992), the optimal rotation period is 37.7 years and the optimal 
harvest percentage is 18%.   Thus the optimal rotation period decreased less than five 
years from the previous example, where r = 3%,  but the optimal harvest percentage 
decreases by 37%.  
 
The effects of changing the marginal amenity value,  γ, holding  r  constant, on the 
optimal rotation period and harvest percentage are shown in Figure  2.3.  As predicted, 
the optimal rotation period is unaffected by the marginal value of the amenity.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
vary. 
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Intuitively, the optimal  H  decreases as  γ   gets larger.  As the value on the x-axis 
doubles, the optimal  H  decreases by one half.  There is an inverse relationship between 
harvest percentage and marginal amenity value.  At  γ = $2.56/boardfoot, the optimal 
harvest becomes no harvest at all.   This is similar to the case where each tree cut down 
might drastically increase the chance of a landslide or damaging erosion.  And although 
not shown on the figure, values of  γ  near $0.01 produce a corner solution, where it is 
best to clear-cut.  The marginal amenity value of each tree is so low that it is better to 
chop all of the trees down to reap the timber value. 
 
The different optimal tax rates for changing values of  r  and γ  are shown in Table 2.1.  
As expected, the clear-cut tax rate increases as the interest rate or gamma increases.  
However, the actual tax penalty, τCC*H2, decreases.  This is due to the graduated nature 
of the tax.  Notice that in no case is the lump sum transfer positive.  Therefore, in every 
non-corner-solution case under the assumptions of this particular model, the dual tax 
instrument will take the form of a clear-cut tax and a lump sum licensing subsidy.  It’s 
likely that a different set of assumptions on the functional form of the externality would 
yield different results.    
 
 
5.   Concluding Remarks 
The consideration of harvest percentage introduces a formidable, interesting, and useful 
economic problem.  I’ve shown how a dual instrument, a clear-cut tax couple with a lump 
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sum tax or subsidy, can be used to remedy an inefficiency where a valuable forest 
amenity is underprovided by a firm that is harvesting too many trees too fast.  The taxes 
would be fairly easy to implement and could be used in a wide variety of realistic 
situations.  Allowing each tax to take the form of a penalty or a refund allows for the use 
of the tax scheme to correct for overgrown forests, therefore aiding in wildfire 
management, and to correct for rotation periods that may be too long when the forest is 
being managed for the benefit of wildlife needing a less mature habitat.      
 
The stylized numerical model shows the wide variety of conditions where the clear-cut 
tax and lump sum transfer could be used to achieve a socially optimal solution when the 
forest amenity is something like erosion control.  In the future, this model could be 
refined and expanded upon in many ways.  It would be interesting to consider different 
types of amenities.  For instance, when wildfire control is considered, it becomes 
necessary keep the harvest fraction above zero. The externalities function with respect to 
the harvest fraction may, in this case, be U-shaped.  Thus it is possible a harvest 
percentage subsidy would be optimal to entice a firm to maintain a forest that is 
unprofitable with respect to timber value.   
  55
Chapter III 
A Risk Assessment of Bisphenol-A:  Accounting for Medical 
Uncertainty and Data Limitations in Environmental Health Problems 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
This paper estimates the damages due to the unregulated use of Bisphenol-A, an 
endocrine disrupter found in polycarbonate plastics, dental fillings, the linings of 
aluminum and tin cans, and in contaminated water supplies.  Endocrine disrupters, 
synthetic chemicals that mimic the effects of human hormones, particularly estrogen, can 
cause fetal deformities, cancer, and negatively effect sperm production.  Estimating the 
possible damages is important to our current government policy, but is also an interesting 
and formidable economic problem due to the uncertainty arising in toxicology.      
 
Many problems in environmental economics deal with carcinogenic chemicals and the 
medical uncertainty that comes with them.  And though the science is still uncertain, 
Congress has already passed three laws, the Food Quality Protection Act (1996), the Safe 
Drinking Water Act (1996), and the Hormone Disruption Research Act (2002), aimed at 
dealing with endocrine disruptors.  On one hand, this legislation is important in 
safeguarding the public health.  On the other hand, as chemical firms are quick to 
emphasize, these chemicals are very useful, and we should be very careful in passing 
legislation that regulates or prohibits them.  
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The difficulty arises in estimating the per capita dose-response function.  First, all of the 
pathways that people can be exposed to Bisphenol-A must be considered in order to 
estimate per capita dosage properly. Second, research on endocrine disrupters requires 
clinical trials, where non-human subjects are typically exposed to doses of the chemical 
that are much higher than humans encounter in the environment. Furthermore, current 
research on Bisphenol-A shows that it can alter fetal and child development at very small 
doses even though negative effects are minimal at high doses.  
 
In this study I use a risk assessment approach to provide a framework for estimating the 
cost of human consumption of chemicals where the dose-response relationship is 
uncertain.  However, I extend current methodology in several significant ways.  First, 
while risk assessment has come a long way towards quantifying uncertainty and 
variability in models in past five years, current practice in the field still typically relies on 
the construction of point estimates, or distributions that rely on at least some point 
estimates. In this model, I estimate a distribution of damages the chemical may cause.  
The distribution reflects:  (1) uncertainty in the varying doses received by different 
groups in the population, (2) uncertainty and variability in the physiological response to 
these doses, and (3) uncertainty and variability in the estimates of the economic costs of 
these responses.  Second, I quantify these uncertainties throughout the model.  
Furthermore, although risk assessment and risk management are typically thought of 
separately, this model combines risk assessment and benefit-cost analysis in a framework 
that can easily be used to analyze the implications of different policies, using current 
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exposure as a baseline. Though steps have already been taken to regulate endocrine 
disrupters, no such study has been done.   
 
This particular model concentrates on quantifying the health costs of future cancers 
caused by fetal exposure to BPA in utero.  In Part 2 of this paper I give a brief overview 
of BPA and the potential problems associated with it. Part 3 gives a brief overview of the 
model as a whole.  Part 4 discusses, in detail, the procedures used to estimate the 
effective dose parameters, including the estimation of consumption of goods that contain 
BPA by the different demographic groups, the amount of BPA leached from each 
particular good, and the fraction of the BPA consumed which is actually active in the 
body.  Part 5 discusses the estimation of the dose response parameters.  Part 6 discusses 
the costs of the potential outcomes and the range of potential damages.      
 
2.  BPA: Exposure Pathways, the Exposed Populations, and Outcomes 
Before diving into the mathematical model, the estimation of parameters, and analysis of 
results, it is important to discuss the nature of Bisphenol-A (BPA).  In any thorough risk 
assessment analysis, there are three major elements of the problem that need to be 
analyzed.  These are exposure pathways, exposed populations, and outcomes.  The rest of 
this section will briefly discuss the environmental estrogen BPA in the context of these 
three categories. 
 
2.1 Exposure Pathways 
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How does one become affected by BPA?  This is the first question that needs to be 
answered in order to properly assess the potential damages caused by the chemical.  All 
relevant exposure pathways must be considered to accurately assess the problem. 
 
With a production rate of over 1.6 billion ponds per year, Bisphenol-A is one of the top 
fifty most-produced chemicals in the U.S. (Vom Saal and Sheehan, 1998).  It is currently 
unregulated and is used as a chemical intermediate for many industrial products, such as 
polymers, resins, and flame retardants (NRS, 1999).  It can be found in polycarbonate 
plastics such as some Tupperware containers, bottled water, baby bottles, food and drink 
cans with lacquer coatings, and some dental sealant (Krishnaan et. al., 1993, Brotons et. 
al., 1995, Olea et. al., 1996, Mountfort et. al., 1997, Howe et. al. 1998, Vom Saal et. al., 
1998, Wingender, et. al., 1998,  Fung et. al. 2000).  It can also leach into ground water 
from waste dumps.   
 
BPA is fairly unstable and leaches into food and liquid that comes into contact with it, 
particularly during heating or autoclaving.  Studies have found 0 to 33 micrograms (0 to 6 
parts per billion (ppb)) of BPA in food contained in lacquer coated cans and water from 
polycarbonate containers (Krishnaan et. al., 1993, Brotons et. al., 1995, Mountfort et. al., 
1997, Howe et. al. 1998, Vom Saal and Sheehan, 1998).  This is below the 10 ppb 
detection limit of U.S. manufacturers of plastics, but above the level (2 ppb) shown to 
cause relevant estrogenic activity in mice (Vom Saal et. al., 1998).  
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BPA can enter the body through the skin, but there have been no studies to suggest a 
relevant reaction is obtained in any way except direct ingestion of the chemical. 
 
2.2 Exposed Populations 
Virtually everyone is exposed to a relevant dose of Bisphenol-A every day.  This study 
limits itself to the U.S. population.  Thus, anyone in the U.S. who eats or drinks 
something out of a can, or plastic container, or gets a tooth filled is exposed to BPA.   
 
Demographic groups differ in their vulnerability to BPA, however.  Developing fetuses, 
for instance, are in particular danger from BPA (Bern, 1992, Vom Saal et. al., 1998, Vom 
Saal and Sheehan, 1998).  Reactions to BPA by adults are probably, at worst, transitory 
(NRC, 1999).  Between the fetus and the adult are three relevant age groups: neonates 
(ages 0-2 years), prepubescent children (ages 2-13 years), and adolescent children (ages 
13 – 18 yrs).  Unfortunately, for these groups there have been no human studies on the 
link between exposure to BPA, or any estrogenic substance, and adverse health effects.27 
Since the adverse outcomes due to prenatal exposure are the most studied, and fetuses are 
widely accepted as the highest risk group, I focus on the effects of BPA due to ingestion 
by pregnant women in the United States.28  
 
2.3 Outcomes 
                                                          
27 Female neonatal rodents exposed to Diethylstilbestrol (DES) suffered genital tract lesions and 
malformations.  (Bern, et. al., 1987, Medlock, et. al., 1988, Brody and Cunha, 1989).  To the best of my 
knowledge, no BPA studies have been performed postnatally on any species.   
28 For more detail about other potentially at risk demographic groups, see the Appendix, Section C. 
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As stated before, Bisphenol-A is an endocrine disruptor, or estrogen mimic.  It is 
approximately 100 times weaker (less estrogenic) than estradiol. However, though it 
binds less frequently to estrogen receptors, it does so in a similar fashion, and therefore 
causes some of the very same results (Nagel et. al., 1997).    
 
BPA causes the proliferation of MCF-7, human mammary cancer, cells (Krishnaan et. al., 
1993, Brotons et. al., 1995, Olea et. al., 1996, Colerangle et. al. Nagel et. al., 1997).  
Although this does not directly lead to the development of cancer, it can cause latent 
cases to become active.  Furthermore, though there is very little data linking BPA to 
cancer cases--due to it’s relative potency only recently being discovered--there is a large 
literature linking diethylstilbestrol (DES), another synthetic chemical which mimics 
estrogen, to testicular and cervicovaginal cancer (Herbst et. al., 1971, Scully et. al., 1974, 
Smith et. al., 1975, Ziel and Finkle, 1975, Poskanzer and Herbst, 1977, Forsberg, 1979, 
Gill et. al., 1979, Henderson et. al., 1979, Herbst et. al. 1979, McLachlan, 1979, Rustia, 
1979, Schottenfield, et. al., 1980, Depue et. al., 1983, Newbold and McLachlan, 1982,  
Leary et. al., 1984, Newbold et. al., 1985, Brown et. al., 1986, Newbold et. al., 1987, 
Bullock et. al. 1988,  Walker et. al., 1988, Bern, 1992, Greco et. al., 1993, Nandi, et. al., 
1995, Hatch et. al., 1998).  Like estradiol, DES is a much stronger estrogen than BPA.  
However, similar, albeit less in number, outcomes can be expected from the ingestion of 
the two chemicals (Nagel, et. al., 1997).  
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This paper focuses on the damages due to extra cases of testicular and cervicovaginal 
cancer caused by fetal exposure to BPA.29  Although BPA may cause other adverse 
health effects, cancer is by far the most costly adverse outcome.30  Furthermore, for other 
outcomes, there is either no clear dose-response relationship, or there is no clear cost of 
the outcome. 31,32    
              
3. The Model:  A Brief Overview 
The model is implemented in the Ox programming language (Doornik, 1999). Surveys of 
medical literature and econometric testing are used to produce estimated distributions of 
the parameters included in the model.  The distribution of total damages is then 
calculated using a Monte Carlo analysis.  The parameter distributions are used as the 
source of 25,000 draws of the vector of parameters, and each vector is then fed into the 
mathematical model described below.   
 
The basic model is shown below: 
(3.1) ∑ Λ= j jiji XI
1
 
                                                          
29 For details on other possible adverse outcomes, see Appendix, section D. 
30 For instance, treatment costs for benign prostatic hyperplasia (BPH) range roughly from $2000 to 
$11,000 in year 2000 dollars (AHCPR, 1994).  More than 90% of males experience some form of BPH by 
the time they are 65 years or older.  However, even if a severe form BPH occurs, on average, at 30 years of 
age in agents exposed to BPA prenatally, and assuming a relatively low discount rate of 3%, the discounted 
cost of the most expensive treatment would be little more than $1 per case.  Therefore, even if the number 
of cases due to BPA were large, these costs would swamped by the costs due to increased cancer incidence.       
31 For example, fetal exposure to BPA causes permanent prostate enlargement in mice (Nagel, et. al., 
1997).  However, it is difficult to ascertain from the data when the onset of the problem would occur in 
humans and how serious the problem would be, given any dose.    
32 In female mice, fetal exposure to BPA can cause an earlier onset of puberty (vom Saal and Sheehan, 
1998).  It would be difficult to nail down, or to even sign, the actual cost of early puberty.  
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(3.2)  Ei= ki*rba 
(3.3) ( )( ) iliiliililil EER Α−Γ+Β+Α= 2  
(3.4) ( )∑= i ilil RNM 1  
(3.5) ( ) ]2)1(1[ llllrTl CCeC l Φ−+Φ= −  
(3.6) CD ll l∑ Μ= 1  
 
Where  Ii  is the amount BPA ingested by agent  i,  Λij  is the amount of good j  consumed 
by agent  i,  Xj  is the amount of BPA that leaches from good  j,  ki  is the amount of BPA 
that reaches the bloodstream of agent  i,33  Ei  is the estradiol equivalent dose of BPA 
received by agent  i,  rba  is relative binding affinity (this is how the relative estrogenicity 
of BPA is measured),  Ril  is the probability that agent  i’s exposure to BPA  will produce 
a new case of outcome  l,  Ail,  Bil,  and  Γιλ,  are matrices of dose-response parameters,  
Ml  is the number of new cases of outcome  l,  Ni  is the population of group  i,  Cl  is the 
cost of outcome l,  C1l is the treatment cost of  outcome  l, C2l is the treatment cost plus 
the value of a life, Φl is the chance of death due to outcome l, Tl is the latency period of 
outcome l, and D is the total predicted damages in dollars   
 
The model can be broken down into three basic pieces that will be discussed in detail in 
the following sections.  The first two equations describe the consumption of goods 
                                                          
33 ki  is meant to capture the possibility that less BPA will cross the placental barrier to reach the fetus than 
the mother ingests.  However, since 100% of the data is based on ingestion by the mother, not the active 
amount of BPA in the fetal bloodstream, ki is equal to one in all cases of this model.  It is, however, left in 
the model in case new data surfaces that would cause it to be different than one. 
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containing BPA, and the active doses received by each agent.  Equations 3.3 and 3.4 
describe the relative strength of BPA to other estrogens and the response to the doses 
received by each agent.34   Equations 3.5 and 3.6 describe the number of new cases of 
each outcome that should be expected and the monetary cost of these outcomes.   
 
4.  Estimating Dosage 
Recall equation 3.1 in the model: 
 
(3.1) ∑ Λ= j jiji XI
1
 
 
It states that ingestion of BPA by an agent in population  i  from goods  1  to  j  is equal to 
the consumption of those goods by the agent multiplied by the amount of BPA that 
leaches from goods  1  to  j. 
 
Thus, in estimating the active dose and agent receives, several things must be considered.  
How much of each product containing BPA does each agent consume?  How much 
Bisphenol-A is does an agent ingest when she consumes a good that has come into 
contact with the chemical?  These issues are discussed in detail below. 
 
4.1 Consumption of Goods Containing BPA 
                                                          
34 Relative Binding Affinity will be described in greater detail later in the paper, but is essentially the link 
between studies using other estrogen-mimicking chemicals and the response that BPA would produce. 
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The goods containing BPA are broken down into seven distinct categories: canned goods, 
dental sealant, bottled water, Tupperware and plastic ware, canned juice, soft drink cans, 
and tap water.35    
 
The 1996 Consumer Expenditure Survey (Diary Survey) is used to estimate the 
expenditure by agents on canned food and canned soft drinks.36  Several methods were 
attempted in estimating average expenditures for the different age and gender groups.   
However, the variance of consumption within groups is very larger relative to the 
variance of consumption between groups.  As a result, it is impossible to discern the 
difference in spending habits between the groups.  It is also difficult to infer from the data 
the amount of each item consumed by each individual within the household. Therefore, 
estimations for expenditures are performed by calculating the mean expenditure and the 
variance for each good within single-female households consisting of women of 
childbearing age (18–40 years old) only.  It is likely that women change their 
consumption habits when living with a roommate or family. 37  However, the differences 
are either insignificant or impossible to infer from the data.  There is a large percentage 
of women in the survey who report spending zero dollars on canned food and soft dinks 
and are therefore assumed to consume zero on average.  The expenditures by women of 
                                                          
35 Baby bottles and beer cans also contain BPA, but pregnant mothers are assumed to consume insignificant 
amounts through these sources. 
36 Data for juice consumption is also included in the survey.  However, the average price was unavailable 
and probably fluctuates widely depending on the type of juice, serving size, and container type.  Therefore, 
a different method, to be discussed later, was used to calculate the consumption of juice. 
37 Women living together in a two person household, on average, spent roughly double the amount on the 
relevant goods. 
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childbearing age who spend a non-zero amount on canned food and soft drinks can be 
seen in Table 3.1.   
  
To translate expenditures into consumption, average 1996 prices for the goods, calculated 
by the Bureau of Labor and Statistics, are used.38  Expenditures are divided by the 
average prices to calculate consumption.  Since the Diary Survey reports expenditures 
over a two-week time period, the results also are converted to daily consumption.  The 
results can be seen in Table 3.1.39   
 
The distributions of consumption of these goods, for those households that consume an 
amount greater than zero on average, are assumed to be log-normal.  However, because 
the population can actually be split into consumers and non-consumers, the draws from 
the distribution describing the population’s average daily consumption are taken in a two 
step process.  First draws are pulled from a uniform distribution ranging from zero to one.  
If the draw is less than or equal to the fraction of the population estimated to consume 
zero, consumption is set to zero.  Draws from the uniform distribution that are greater 
than the fraction of the population consuming zero are mapped into the log-normal 
distribution that describes the variability in consumption patterns of consumers of the 
good. For example, I estimate that 65% of women between 18 and 40 years old do not 
consume soft drinks on a daily basis.  Therefore draws from a uniform distribution less 
                                                          
38 Soda is priced per 12 ounces.  The canned goods are priced as the average between canned corn and 
canned tomatoes, per pound. 
39 Fetuses are assumed to consume exactly what their mother consumes.  All data gathered shows a 
response due to fetal exposure to estrogen, based on doses received by the mother.   
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than or equal to 0.65 are set equal to zero.  Draws from the uniform distribution that are 
greater than 0.65 are mapped into a lognormal distribution with a mean of 0.78 (12 ounce 
units) and a standard deviation of 0.57.  
 
Data on water consumption is obtained from the International Bottled Water 
Association’s (IBWA) website.40 From a survey conducted in 2000, IBWA finds that the 
average American drinks 6.1 8 ounce servings of water per day.  They also find that on 
average, a person drinks 3.8 servings of tap water and 2.3 servings of bottled water.  No 
confidence intervals around these estimates are reported.  They do, however, report that 
some people drink as few as zero servings per day and others drink as many as 12 
servings.  Therefore, a triangular distribution ranging from zero to 12 (8 ounce servings), 
with a mode of 6.1 is used to describe the variability in water consumption.  Draws 
representing total average daily water consumption are taken from this distribution.  
 
To calculate tap water consumption, the draws from total water consumption distribution 
are multiplied by the average fraction that the IBWA estimates to be consumed as tap 
water:  3.8 tap water servings divided by 6.1 total servings.  Likewise, to calculate bottled 
water consumption, the draws from total water consumption distribution are multiplied 
by the average fraction that the IBWA estimates to be consumed as bottled water:  2.3 
bottled water servings divided by 6.1 total servings.  However, not all bottled water will 
contain BPA.  Only water consumed from three or five gallon water tanks (made of 
                                                          
40 http://www.bottledwater.org/public/BWFactsHome_main.htm (October, 2002) 
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polycarbonate plastic) will contain BPA.  Therefore the bottled water estimate must also 
be scaled by the percentage consumed from large water tanks.  Since there is virtually no 
data detailed enough to separate five-gallon bottled water consumption from other bottled 
water consumption, I assume that between 10% and 50% of all bottled water consumed 
comes from three or five gallon tanks made of polycarbonate plastic.41       
 
For canned juice consumption, data is yet again an issue.  The 1996 Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (Diary Survey) is used to estimate that estimate that 77% of women 
between 18 and 40 years old do not consume juice on a daily basis.  However, since the 
price of juice varies greatly between types of juice and brand, the expenditure data can 
not be used to estimate average consumption.  Instead, estimates of U.S. production from 
the USDA’s Fruit and Tree Nuts Yearbook Summary (2002) are used to calculate that the 
average American drinks 3.2 ounces of juice daily.  However, IBWA’s 2000 survey of 
beverage intake finds that the average person drinks 1.1 servings (8 ounces) per day.  
These values are used as data points to estimate a lognormal distribution of juice 
consumption.  However, since both the survey and the national data include non-juice 
drinkers, the mean and standard deviation of the distribution must be adjusted 
accordingly.  The final distribution used to model juice consumption by agents that 
consume more than zero servings everyday is a lognormal with a mean of 3.26 servings 
per day and a standard deviation of 1.04.   
 
                                                          
41 Since bottled water is recently so readily available in other forms (besides the 5 gallon version) 50% is 
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There is yet another problem:  juice comes in many types of containers.  Juice can be 
packaged in plastic (non-polycarbonate), paper or cardboard, glass, or cans.  To my 
knowledge, data breaking the consumption of juice down to this detail is unavailable.  
Therefore, I assume that between 10% and 50% of juice consumed is consumed from 
cans.  Each draw from the triangular distribution described above is scaled by a draw 
from a uniform distribution ranging between 0.1 and 0.5.  The simulated data will contain 
both variability and uncertainty in the estimate of juice consumed from cans.   
 
No data could be found concerning the daily use of Tupperware and plastic ware.  I 
assume that the lower bound on average use of Tupperware and plastic ware is 0.  I 
assume the upper bound is not higher than the number of meals an average person will 
eat in a day.  Therefore the upper bound is set at 3.  The distribution between these two 
points is assumed to be uniform.  Not all Tupperware and plastic ware is made of 
potentially BPA-leaching polycarbonate plastic.  In fact, very few of the products 
considered “Tupperware” or plastic ware (including products by Tupperware, 
Rubbermaid, Playtex, Ziploc, etc.) are made from polycarbonate plastic.42  However, no 
actual percentages of the products marketed containing polycarbonate plastic are 
published.  For the purpose of this paper, the percentage of plastic storage items and 
utensils used that contain BPA is assumed to be between 10% and 40%.  Therefore draws 
from the distribution described above are scaled by draws from another a uniform 
distribution ranging between 0.1 and 0.4.  The data simulated during the Monte Carlo 
                                                                                                                                                                             
likely to be an upper bound.  
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process should roughly describe the variability and uncertainty involved in the estimation 
of average use of polycarbonate plastic ware.       
 
The average daily amount of dental sealant procedures is calculated using data from the 
American Dental Association’s “The 1990 Survey of Dental Services Rendered”.  The 
number of possible teeth an agent can get sealed varies with the agent’s age.  In 
calculating the average amount of sealant each fetus is exposed to, the model multiplies 
the number of teeth an agent might get sealed by the probability that a particular agent 
will get the procedure done on any given day, and again by the probability that the agent 
is pregnant.43  Needless to say, this number is very small.  Furthermore, the sealant does 
not leach detectable amounts more than three hours after application (Fung et. al. 2000), 
so the exposure is a one-shot dose.  However, since a fetus exposed to even very low 
doses of BPA during gestation may experience an adverse outcome, it remains important 
to include dental sealant exposure in the model.44   
    
If an agent has a sealant procedure done, the variability in the number of number of teeth 
that an agent has sealed is captured by a triangular distribution ranging between 1 and the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
42 http://www.chnet.org/healthhouse/pdf/plasticchart.pdf,  (October, 2002) 
43 The probability that a fetus is exposed to BPA leached from dental sealant is the probability that a female 
gets the sealant procedure done on a given day times the probability that she is pregnant.  The probability 
that a woman is pregnant (with a male or female child) on a given day is calculated by dividing the number 
of births (male or female) in a year by the population of women in the U.S..  The number of births and the 
populations estimates are taken from the 2000 U.S. Census, conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau.     
44 Though most of the dose response data is taken from studies where subjects were given either daily or 
weekly doses through much of the gestation period, the dental sealant exposure is left in the model without 
discount for two primary reasons:  1.) because it is uncertain whether the total dose of BPA or a dose given 
on any (or a particular) single day is what drives the adverse response; and 2.) because the probability is 
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maximum number of possible teeth.  For an adult female, the maximum number of teeth 
that could be sealed on a given day is 16.45   The mode is four teeth.    
 
4.2  Leaching 
Much literature has been written recently about the amount of BPA that is actually 
ingested when a particular good is consumed.  However, the subject is fairly 
controversial.  First, the reported amount of BPA leached from a particular good differs 
greatly depending on the techniques used for extraction and measurement.  Second, none 
of the consumable goods are actually measured for BPA content.  For instance, in a 
typical study, cans containing a food item are emptied, autoclaved, then the water from 
the autoclaving process is measured for BPA content (Krishnaan et. al. 1993, Howe et. 
al. 1998).  To first order, this is a fair measurement, since cans are typically packed 
directly after autoclaving.  However, the liquor and food that is actually packaged in the 
cans is in contact with the partially unpolymerized resin lining much longer than the 
autoclaved water.  Furthermore, water is neutral but the liquor used to store food is 
typically acidic. Therefore, these measurements are likely to be lower bounds.  Brotons 
et. al. (1995) actually does measure the BPA found in the liquors.  Therefore, the Brotons 
estimates are used in the model.46   
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
very small that a pregnant woman will have procedure on a given day, the model results are relatively 
insensitive to changes in this particular parameter.    
45 This does not include wisdom teeth that are rarely sealed. 
46 See Appendix D for more detail on the Brotons et. al. data and how the canned food leaching parameter 
is calculated. 
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There are two articles reporting leaching from dental sealant (Olea et. al., 1996, Fung et. 
al. 2000).  These also differ in methodology and results. Results from each paper are used 
to calculate the amount of BPA leached per gram of tooth sealed.47 
 
Data for the rest of the BPA leaching from containers is obtained from Takao et. al. 
(1999).  Takao reports direct experimental results for the amount of BPA (in or ppb or 
µg/l) that can be found in groundwater, soft drink cans, and polycarbonate baby bottles.  
Tupperware and water bottles are assumed to leach BPA at a similar rate to 
polycarbonate baby bottles.48 
 
Canned juice either comes in can similar to those holding food or similar to those holding 
soft drinks.  To calculate the BPA leaching into canned juice, it is assumed similar to the 
average of the amount that leaches from food cans and the amount that leaches into soft 
drink cans.   
 
4.3 Dosage Received Results 
The results of the Monte Carlo simulation for the   Ii  distributions can be seen in the 
Table 3.2 and Chart 3.1.  The distributions reflect both uncertainty and variability in 
consumption habits and variability in leaching. Since the draws for male and female fetal 
exposure are taken from identical (except in the case of dental sealant) distributions, the 
                                                          
47 See Appendix D for more detail on the Olea and Fung data and the calculation of dental sealant the 
leaching parameter. 
48 See Appendix D for more detail on the Takao et. al. data and the calculation of the relevant leaching 
parameters.  
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statistics for each are not significantly different from each other.  More than 50 percent of 
the average exposure to BPA is through consumption of goods stored or prepared in 
polycarbonate plastic ware.  Roughly 15% comes from canned food and 13% from tap 
water.  As expected, the average daily exposure due to dental sealant accounts for a 
relatively insignificant percentage ( < 0.1%) of the total exposure. 
 
The estimated distribution of average total daily ingestion of BPA by pregnant women is 
roughly lognormal, has a mean of 8 µg, a standard deviation of 5.4 µg, and a 95% 
confidence interval ranging between 1 and 21 µg. The maximum value drawn from the 
distribution is 99 µg. This range is well below the 50 mg/kg dose under which the plastics 
industry finds no adverse effect in animals tested using high dose methods (vom Saal and 
Sheehan, 1998).  However, vom Saal and Sheehan (1998) assert that there is no dose 
under which there is no observed effect.  Nagel et. al., (1997) show significant effects on 
offspring of mice fed 2 µg/kg body weight during gestation.49  This translates roughly to 
a dose between 100 and 150 µg for a pregnant human.  Thus, these potential exposure 
ranges, based on reasonable average consumption and leaching estimates, are extremely 
low.  This fact will play an important role in the results that follow.   
 
5.  Estimating Dose Response            
Estimating the dose response function is not as simple as building a good model, getting 
the data, and running a regression.  First, the realization that Bisphenol-A is relevantly 
                                                          
49 This is the lowest dose study published at the time of this study. 
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estrogenic and that it is present in many of things we consume is a fairly recent 
development.  So there are no studies of the effects of BPA on human subjects and 
relatively few on animals.   Second, the studies that are conducted vary in procedure and 
are typically performed using unrealistically high doses.  To combat the first problem, I 
obtained data from experiments with other chemicals with similar properties, such as 
estradiol and diethylstilbestrol (DES).  There have been numerous studies, including ones 
with human subjects, about the effects of DES.  It is a much stronger estrogen mimic than 
BPA (Nagel et. al., 1997), so using the data to infer damages potentially caused by BPA 
requires an intermediate step.  I use a measure of estrogenicity called relative binding 
affinity (RBA) to tie the DES and estradiol studies to BPA.  RBA is discussed in greater 
detail below.  To combat the second problem, care must be taken to understand how 
procedures may have affected the outcomes of each study.  Furthermore, because low 
dose--or relevant dose--studies are sparse, it is important to correctly account for variance 
in the estimations.   
 
5.1 Relative Binding Affinity 
The relative level of bioactivity of estrogenic substances, or estrogenicity, is typically 
measured by “relative binding affinity” (RBA).  RBA is calculated by measuring how 
much MFC-7 cell proliferation a certain amount of a chemical causes under controlled 
conditions.50  The chemical being tested competes with estradiol to bind to estrogen 
                                                          
50 MFC-7 cells are human mammory cancer cells. 
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receptors.  A chemical’s “affinity” for the estrogen receptors is proportional to how well 
it competes with the estradiol. 
 
There are many different variations of the test and, of course, many variations in the 
results each test produces.  Not long ago the literature had a difficult time explaining why 
Bisphenol-A, when tested for relative binding affinity in vitro was only weakly 
estrogenic, but was producing profound effects when tested in vivo.  Nagel et al. (1997) 
developed a test that seems to explain the discrepancy.  When the standard in vitro assays 
are modified with human blood serum, the measured RBA for Bisphenol-A becomes a 
much better indicator of actual in vivo effects.  Because the tests developed by Nagel et. 
al. are able to most accurately predict the level of bioactivity Bisphenol-A will produce in 
mice and rats, I use their numbers for the relative binding affinity parameter,  rba, in the 
model.  
 
(3.2) Ei= ki*rba 
 
This measurement allows me to tie DES studies to the BPA model in equation 2 shown 
above.51  Nagel et. al. show that the relative binding affinity of BPA to DES is 0.01 with 
a standard error of 0.0012.  The distribution describing the variability around Nagel’s 
mean estimate of relative binding affinity is assumed to be normal.  
 
                                                          
51 As stated earlier, k is assumed to be equal to one due to the nature of the data collected for this study.   
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5.2  Dose Response Data 
As stated previously, because the relatively high estrogenic strength of BPA has only 
recently been discovered, there is very little data linking it directly to cases of cancer. 52  
However, there is a large literature linking DES, or diethylstilbestrol, to testicular and 
cervicovaginal cancer (Herbst et. al., 1971, Scully et. al., 1974, Smith et. al., 1975, Ziel 
and Finkle, 1975, Poskanzer and Herbst, 1977, Forsberg, 1979, Gill et. al., 1979, 
Henderson et. al., 1979, Herbst et. al. 1979, McLachlan, 1979, Rustia, 1979, 
Schottenfield, et. al., 1980, Depue et. al., 1983, Newbold and McLachlan, 1982,  Leary 
et. al., 1984, Newbold et. al., 1985, Brown et. al., 1986, Newbold et. al., 1987, Bullock 
et. al. 1988,  Walker et. al., 1988, Bern, 1992, Greco et. al., 1993, Nandi, et. al., 1995, 
Hatch et. al., 1998). Many of these studies are “case-control” studies, where a group of 
cancer patients (case) and people without a history of cancer (control) are questioned to 
see if they were exposed to various things that may have led to the cancer, including 
DES.  These types of studies are able establish a relationship between cancer and DES 
exposure, but cannot be used to establish a dose response relationship.  To estimate a 
dose response curve, data that convey what the incidence rate of cancer is among those 
exposed to DES, and how much they were exposed to, is needed.  There are few studies 
that fit the criteria, and the doses received in the human studies are uncertain.  Therefore 
it is necessary to include data from studies performed on mice. Although not ideal, these 
studies are useful since the underlying mechanisms of the action of hormones are 
fundamentally the same across all vertebrates (vom Saal et. al., 1998).     
                                                          
52 Krishnaan et. al. (1993) were the first to find that BPA was more estrogenic than previously thought. 
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To estimate the dose response function for testicular cancer due to DES exposure, I use 
data obtained from Leary et. al. (1984), and Newbold et. al. (1985, 1987).  The Leary 
study contains data for 781 DES intrauterine-exposed subjects and 676 unexposed 
controls.  Two of the DES exposed men had a history of testicular cancer.  None of the 
men in the control group had cancer.53 The exact dose of each study participant is not 
known, but the average daily dose per quartile during gestation of the population is 
known (5.5 mg/day, 6.9mg/day, 10.4 mg/day, and 23.3 mg/day, respectively).  These 
mean doses are use to break the exposed data into 4 separate dose groups, each with same 
testicular cancer incidence rate, and a zero dose group with a zero incidence rate. Both 
Newbold papers are studies on mice.  The 1985 study contains data on 233 pregnant mice 
exposed to 100 µg/kg of body weight daily during gestation and 96 unexposed controls.  
The incidence rate of testicular cancer among offspring of the exposed group was 4.7% 
and zero among the controls.  The 1987 study provides data on 277 pregnant mice 
exposed to 100 µg/kg of body weight daily during gestation and 122 controls.  Offspring 
of the exposed group had a testicular cancer incidence rate of 1.8%.  The incidence rate 
of controls was zero.  All doses used in the data set are converted to micrograms and, in 
the mouse studies, adjusted to reflect a similar dose for a human weighing 70 kg.54   
 
                                                          
53 The cancer incidence in both groups may be underestimated, since the ages of those in the study were 
between 18 and 45 years.   
54 In addition to a correction for weight, a correction for free estradiol in the serum of the agent should be 
used in future versions of the model.  The more free estradiol present in the system, the less effective BPA 
will be.  Humans typically have a greater ratio of free estradiol than rats, therefore this data may overstate 
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To estimate the dose response function for cervicovaginal cancer due to DES exposure, I 
use data obtained from Newbold and McLachlan (1982) and Hatch et. al. (1998).  The 
Hatch study examines the cancer rate among a total of 4536 intrauterine DES-exposed 
women and 1544 unexposed controls.  The cervicovaginal cancer incidence rate among 
the exposed women was 0.066%.  The incidence rate among the controls was zero.55  
Since exact doses for the women exposed prenatally is not known, the dose data from 
Leary et. al. (1984) is used to approximate the doses for quartiles of the sample, as 
explained in the previous paragraph.  In the Newbold and McLachlan study, data for 91 
mice exposed prenatally exposed to various doses of DES and 158 unexposed controls 
are reported.  Of 29 mice exposed to 5 µg/kg/day of gestation, one contracted an 
adenocarcinoma in the vagina.  Zero of 16 mice exposed to 10 µg/kg/day contracted 
cancer.  One of 46 mice given 100 µg/kg/day prenatally got cancer.  The incidence rate 
among controls was zero.  All doses used in the data set are converted to micrograms and, 
in the mouse studies, adjusted to reflect a similar dose for a human weighing 70 kg.   
 
Note that all of the data described above should be considered high dose data, since the 
estimated daily amount of BPA exposure adjusted for RBA is equal to somewhere 
between 0.01 and 0.21 µg (with 95% confidence) of daily DES exposure.                                           
     
5.3  Estimating the Dose Response Function        
                                                                                                                                                                             
the effects of BPA in humans.  The current problem is that a reasonable estimate of the free estradiol ratio 
in human fetal serum is unavailable.    
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Typical risk assessment studies use a linear or exponential function to estimate dose 
response (Griffiths, et. al., 2002).  To deal with low dose (dose ranges below their lowest 
observed dose) estimation, they force the function through the origin by drawing a line, 
or a curve, from the response level at the lowest observed dose through the origin, or 
some value along the x-axis deemed to be the threshold dose (Griffiths, et. al., 2002).  
This method has two major problems:  (1) it assumes monotonicity and (2) it does not 
properly account for the natural incidence rate of the outcome or the variance around the 
low doses.  
 
In all vertebrates, including humans, an active amount of free estradiol is already present 
in the body.  Therefore, according vom Saal et. al. (1998), vom Saal and Sheehan (1998) 
and Nagel et. al. (1997), any perturbation by the ingestion of estrogen-like substances 
will cause a significant reaction.  Furthermore, as the exposure levels increase and 
estrogen receptors in the system become saturated, the response to a marginal increase in 
an estrogen mimic may decrease.  Therefore, there is no threshold dose (dose below 
which there is no observable reaction) and the response function may be nonmonotonic.       
 
Using the data described above, a quadratic function, shown below, that allows for 
nonmonotonicity in predicting the response to a DES equivalent dose of BPA, is 
estimated.  Note that from here on, for stylistic simplicity, I refer to exposure to a “DES 
equivalent dose of BPA” as simply as “a dose of BPA”.       
                                                                                                                                                                             
55 Again, the cancer incidence in both groups may be underestimated, since the ages of those in the study 
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(3.3)   ( )( ) iliiliililil
unctionEstimatedF
EER Α−Γ+Β+Α= 44444 344444 21
2    
 
Ail   captures the natural occurring incidence rate of outcome  l, in agent  i, given no 
exposure to BPA. Βil  and  Γil    capture the slope and curvature of the function that 
describes additional response due to BPA exposure.  Thus, this function allows for the 
removal of the estimated natural incidence rate in the sample in order to calculate the 
additional number of cancers due only to BPA exposure. The results of the regressions 
are shown in Table 3.3.56 
 
In both response-function estimates for testicular and cervicovaginal cancer respectively, 
except for the testicular cancer constant term, all estimated coefficients are significant.  In 
both estimations, the F-statistic is significant but the R2-statistic is extremely low (though 
the statistics for the testicular cancer regression are significantly higher).  The significant 
F-statistics are encouraging, and the low R2-statistics are to be expected with so few data 
points available.  The errors around the mean estimates are assumed to be normal.57 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
were between 18 and 45 years.   
56 Although there were some zero dose response data points, the sample is too small to infer that the 
incident rate for the population would be zero given a zero dose. 
57 With such a low R2 statistic, this assumption of normality in the errors may not be a good one.  Because 
very little of the variance is explained by the model, it may be better to use a uniform distribution for the 
error terms and various confidence intervals around the mean.  This may be taken into account in a later 
version of the model.  
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Looking at both the estimation results and the estimated functions, shown in Charts 3.2, 
3.3, 3.4, and 3.5, it is apparent that both dose response functions are increasing over the 
relevant range of doses, but nonmonotonic.58  Although the squared terms in both 
functions are negative and significant, the estimated coefficients are so small that the 
function appears to be nearly linear throughout the observed range. Also, for any given 
dose, the testicular cancer response is greater than the cervicovaginal cancer response by 
more than a factor of 50.  This is also apparent in simulated response distributions shown 
in Charts 3.6 and 3.7.   One possible explanation for this is that cervicovaginal cancer is 
simply harder to get.  Testicular cancer is fairly rare, with an incidence rate of 14 per 
100,000 men (SEER database, 2000).59  However, the adenocarcinomas found in women 
exposed to DES almost never occur in women not exposed to DES (Herbst et. al., 1979).  
Another possible explanation is that perturbations of the natural levels of estrogen during 
gestation may simply affect male offspring more than female offspring.   
 
Also worth noting is that due to (1) the availability of only relatively high-dose study data 
and (2) the use of DES data as a proxy, the range of environmentally relevant doses 
observed is very near the origin in Charts 3.2 and 3.4.  Therefore in Charts 3.3.and 3.5, 
the dose response curves are shown only for the environmentally relevant dose range.  On 
observation of these charts, it becomes obvious that the large amount of variance that 
occurs at high doses nearly disappears completely at such low doses. Even over a total 
                                                          
58 One drawback of the quadratic function is that, if the coefficient on the squared term is negative and 
significant, the function will eventually pass through the x-axis.  This is counter intuitive.  However, in this 
case the function passes through the x-axis far beyond the relevant dose range.  In fact, the function is 
nearly linear through the relevant dose range. 
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population exposed of about 4 million, this amount of variance will contribute little to the 
variance in the final distribution of damages, and the low dose uncertainty is probably 
underestimated.  Though far from perfect, this method is still an improvement over 
methods that do not directly account for background incidence rates and the possibility of 
nonmonotonicity in the dose response function.    
 
5.4  Increased Cancer Incidence Results 
 The number of new future cases of cancer contracted each year, given estimated average 
ingestion of BPA, is calculated as in equation 3.4: 
 
(3.4)   ( )∑= i ilil RNM 1                   
 
The number of new cases of outcome  l,  Ml, is calculated by multiplying the dose 
response function by the population.60  The estimated constant term and the variance 
around it are subtracted from the response function.  Recall the constant term explains the 
natural incidence rate expected in the sample.  Therefore, it must be removed in order to 
calculate the number of cases attributable only to BPA exposure.  The results of the 
simulation can be seen in Charts 3.8 and 3.9.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
59 This is rate is for men ages 30 to 40, where the incidence rate peaks.  
60 The population of male (female) fetuses in a given year is calculated by multiplying the number of births 
in 1998 by the ratio born male(female) (2000 census).  It is calculated that there are 2,014,287 male fetuses 
per year and 1,923,713 female fetuses.  The population parameters are assumed uniformly distributed 
between -500 and +500 of the calculated values to account for rounding errors in the census data.  
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The distribution of new future testicular cancer cases per year caused by BPA exposure 
has a mean of 0.57 and a standard deviation of 0.39 (with a 95% confidence interval 
bound between 0.11 and 1.31).  This translates roughly to a mean of 0.028 new cases of 
testicular cancer per year per 100,000 exposed in utero, or one new case of testicular 
cancer due to BPA exposure every other year.      
 
The distribution of new future cervicovaginal cancer cases per year caused by BPA 
exposure has a mean of 0.01 and a standard deviation of 0.01 (with a 95% confidence 
interval bound between 0 and 0.03).  This translates roughly to a mean of 0.0005 new 
cases of cervicovaginal cancer per year per 100,000 exposed in utero, or one new case of 
cervicovaginal cancer due to BPA exposure every 100 years!     
 
As is obvious, the estimated frequency of future cancers stemming from current exposure 
levels of BPA is extremely low.  This is most likely due to very low levels of average 
ingestion of BPA.  However, it is possible, as explained earlier, that the uncertainty in 
dose response at such low levels of exposure are underestimated in this model.  
Therefore, sensitivity analysis, discussed in Section 7, is essential in order to understand 
the robustness of this result.        
         
 
6.  Estimating Damages 
The distributions of the costs of each outcome are estimated using equation 3.5 in the 
model: 
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(3.5)   ( )( )[ ]rCCeC llllrTl l /2)1(1 Φ−+Φ= −  
 
Cl  is the total cost of an outcome.  C1l  is the cost of the outcome, given the agent lives.  
In this version of the model, it assumed to be equal to the estimated average treatment 
costs of the outcome.  C2l  is the cost of the outcome if the agent dies.  It is assumed to be 
the treatment cost plus the estimated value of a statistical life.61  Φl  is the probability, 
given the agent has the disease, that the agent survives. The costs are discounted over Tl, 
the estimated latency period of the particular outcome.  The total costs are discounted 
over the full latency period, from birth to the time the disease is discovered.  Any benefits 
of regulation on BPA will not be accrued until the age at which a people would, with the 
current level of BPA, begin seeing symptoms of the adverse outcomes.  
 
The mean treatment cost in 1990 for cervicovaginal cancer, $44,444, and the standard 
deviation of the treatment cost is obtained from cervical cancer cost data supplied by the 
U.S. National Institutes of Health, Office of Science Policy and Planning.  The standard 
deviation for the mean treatment cost is assumed to be similar to that calculated for 
ovarian cancer in Fireman et. al. (1997).62  The estimated treatment cost of ovarian 
cancer had the highest estimated standard error, relative to other cancers studied in 
                                                          
61 The estimated costs do not include other indirect costs, such as pain and suffering or  lost work days. 
Furthermore, the estimates do not account for the severity of the outcome, except with the survival rate.  
Later versions of the model should include this detail. 
62 Fireman et. al. (1997) provides a comprehensive estimate of treatment costs of various types of cancers.  
Unfortunately, neither cervicovaginal nor testicular cancers are represented in the study.  The NIH data 
contained mean estimates of cost, but no estimation of variance.     
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Fireman, so this should provide an upper bound on the variability around the estimates 
for the treatment of cervicovaginal cancer.  The errors are assumed to be normally 
distributed.   
 
The range of possible treatment costs in 1992 for testicular cancer, $29,300 to $47,360 
was obtained from the Testicular Cancer Resource Center (2003). All treatment cost 
estimates are converted to year 2000 dollars using the GDP deflator published in the 2002 
Economic Report of the President. 
 
The distribution of the value of a statistical life (VSL) is calculated using data obtained 
from the EPA’s, “The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act 1990 to 2002” (1999). The 
EPA provides a list of estimates of 26 policy-relevant value-of-life studies.  The 
Landefeld (1979) survey method used to determine the value of avoiding death due to 
cancer is added to the list because of its particular relevance to this study.  The full list 
used is shown in Table 3.4. The value of a statistical life is difficult to estimate and the 
uncertainty as to the “correct” VSL must be portrayed with a distribution.     Therefore, a 
log-normal distribution, with a mean of $5,708,000 and a standard deviation of 
$4,040,000 (in year 2000 dollars), is estimated using the data provided.  
 
Survival rates can be expected to vary due to the progress of the disease before diagnosis 
and due to individual characteristics. The survival rate of those with cervicovaginal 
cancer (62.5% - 66.0%) is assumed to range uniformly between the survival rates for 
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cervical cancer in the years 1990 and 1999 as calculated by the NIH (2003), Office of 
Science Policy and Planning.  The 93.3% mean survival rate for testicular cancer is found 
using the SEER data base.  A 10% range around the mean is assumed.63  Therefore, a 
uniform distribution ranging from 88.3% to 98.3% is used in the model. 
 
The results of the simulation for undiscounted costs per additional case of cancer are 
shown in Charts 3.10 and 3.11. 
 
Due to higher direct costs and a lower survival rate, cervicovaginal cancer is, on average, 
nearly five times more costly per case to treat than testicular cancer.  The model results 
show that cervicovaginal cancer has a mean cost of $2,147,492 and 95% confidence 
interval ranging from $1,447,448 to $4,497,910.  Testicular cancer has a mean cost of 
$433,677 and 95% confidence interval ranging from 139,151 to 968,004.  The wide 
confidence intervals can be attributed mainly to uncertainty in the value of statistical life.   
 
The distribution for the latency periods – from birth to the onset of symptoms – for 
testicular and cervicovaginal cancer are estimated using data from the SEER database.  
SEER publishes incidence rates for different cancer sites for five-year age groups.  This 
data is used to produce a sort of “step” function, where different age groups have a 
different odds of being drawn on a given Monte Carlo run, but ages within an age group 
have an equal chance of being drawn any on any given run.  Thus, multiple uniform 
                                                          
63 In future versions of the model, the mean survival rates, as estimated in the SEER database, should be 
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distributions, each covering a range of five years, are connected to form the final 
distribution and account for variability in the latency periods. Draws from the distribution 
produced a mean latency of 34 years and 55 years for testicular and cervicovaginal cancer 
respectively.  
 
The Office of Management and Budget (1992) suggests that U.S. government agencies 
use a real interest rate of 7% in cost-benefit calculations.  However, the discount rate is 
fairly controversial, and no one really knows what the “correct” discount rate is. Thus it 
is necessary to capture some uncertainty in the OMB estimate.  To correctly capture all of 
the variability and uncertainty throughout the entire model, the uncertainty as to the 
“correct” discount rate is first portrayed with a distribution.   In the model, the 
uncertainty in the discount rate is captured with a triangular distribution ranging between 
3% and 9%, and with a mode of 7%.   
 
The total damages (in year 2000 dollars) caused by unregulated use of BPA are 
calculated in equation (3.6): 
 
(3.6)   CD ll l∑ Μ= 1  
 
Total damages equal the sum of the new cases of cancer attributable to BPA exposure 
multiplied by the cost of each case.  The estimated damage statistics are shown in Table 
                                                                                                                                                                             
used and the number of cancer survivors should be drawn from a binomial distribution. 
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3.6.  The estimated distributions of total and annual damages are shown in Chart 3.12 and 
Chart 3.13 respectively. 
 
Due to the small number of additional cancers caused by BPA, and the long latency 
period, the mean estimated damage due to BPA exposure is a relatively small $332,377 
even though the population exposed is large and the adverse effects are serious. The 
undiscounted mean annual costs are estimated to be $271,791 per year.  As expected, 
because the additional frequency of cervicovaginal cancer to BPA is so small, and the 
latency period is very long, the damages due to this type of cancer contribute only 21.3% 
to the total estimated damages.  Roughly 78.7% of the total damages are due to additional 
cases of testicular cancer. 
 
The distributions are wide for both the estimated annual and total damages with 95% 
confidence intervals ranging from $43,808 to $748,139 per year and $11,347 to 
$1,304,023 total.  Furthermore, the Chart 3.12 shows that the mode of the distribution of 
total damages is close to zero, whereas the mode for annual damages is around $100,000 
per year.   This information, along with the fact that the distribution of estimated total 
damages is significantly wider than the distribution of estimated annual damages means 
that the model results are sensitive to the discount rate.  Furthermore, since there is very 
little variance in the dose-response function near the origin, this uncertainty in the annual 
and total damages must also stem from the uncertainty in the value of a statistical life 
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estimate and the variation in the consumption of goods containing BPA.  The following 
section analyzes the model’s sensitivity to these uncertainties more thoroughly. 
 
7.  Model Analysis   
As discussed briefly in the previous section, the uncertainty in the final damage 
distribution comes from a few different sources with in the model.  Reducing the variance 
or uncertainty in different variables will certainly reduce the amount of uncertainty in the 
final estimate.  However, the most interesting story in this particular model turns out to 
be how low the mean estimated damages are.  Is it the actual data, or an assumption about 
a parameter or the structure of the model that drives this result?  This is the key question 
examined in this section.  Therefore the sensitivity analysis below emphasizes how 
certain parameters shift the mean.   
 
Charts 3.14 and 3.15 show the new estimated distributions of total damages when the 
discount rate is set to 7% and 3% respectively.  The real discount rate of 7% is chosen 
both because it is relatively high and is suggested for use in benefits-costs analysis by the 
OMB (1992).  Although 7% is just one percentage point higher than the mean of the 
uniform distribution used in the base model, the change produces a nearly 50% decrease 
in mean total damages.  This reduction from $332,377 to $178,977 is indeed significant.  
Thus, it is expected that lowering the discount rate to 3%, a rate that is still realistic but 
closer to the zero discount rate desired by some environmental groups, would drastically 
increase the mean estimated damages.  When the 3% discount rate is implemented in the 
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model, the result is a near 500% increase in the total damages, from $332,377 to 
$1,991,183 with a 95% confidence interval ranging from $259,177 to $6,022,751.  The 
model results are certainly sensitive to the discount rate, which in retrospect shows the 
importance of including a distribution rather than a point in the original model. However, 
even reducing the rate to 3% does not produce damage estimates that are likely to be 
significant compared to the potential costs to the plastics industry and the U.S. economy 
were BPA to be regulated.    
 
Charts 3.16 and 3.17 show the new estimated distributions of total estimated damages 
when the value of a statistical life (VSL) is set to roughly double the mean of the 
distribution used in the original version of the model and the mean, respectively.  As 
expected in a fairly linear model, reducing a distribution to the mean hardly changes the 
final estimate of mean total damages.  In fact, setting the VSL to $5,788,000 results in a 
total damage estimate of $330,509, 99% of the base mean estimate.  However, nailing the 
VSL down to the mean decreases the total variance in the estimated distribution of 
damages by 44%.  The value of life measure thus accounts for a significant amount of the 
uncertainty in the final distribution and, therefore, it is important that the uncertainty of 
the VSL estimate was included in the original model.  When the VSL parameter is 
increased to $12,500,000, the mean total damage estimated increases by a little more than 
double the original estimate.  Even pushing the VSL estimate up to the 95th percentile of 
the estimated distribution does little more than double the relatively small mean estimated 
damages.       
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Thus the uncertainty in the estimates of economic parameters contribute to the 
uncertainty in the damage estimate but do not explain the very low estimate of total 
damages due to BPA.  As stated earlier, the amount of BPA ingested on average is so low 
that very few cancers can realistically be attributed to this exposure, even during the 
critical phases of fetal development.  It is possible however, that for some reason or 
another, the estimated distribution of BPA ingestion understates the amount people are 
exposed to every day.  To examine the sensitivity of the results to ingestion, the model 
was rerun imposing  the assumption that everyone, everyday, ingests what the 99th 
percentile of the estimated distribution ingest:  25µg.  The new distribution of total 
damages is shown in Chart 3.18.  The distribution has a mean of $1,049,056 and 95% 
confidence interval ranging from $65,714 to $3,840,583.  These damage estimates stem 
from an increase in the mean testicular cancer frequency (over the entire population) 
from 0.57 new cases per year to year to 1.77 new cases per year and an increase in the 
cervicovaginal caner frequency from 0.01 new cases per year to 0.04 new cases per year.  
Though it increases cancer frequencies significantly, even this unrealistic assumption on 
BPA exposure does not increase the total estimated damages to much more than 1 million 
dollars.   
 
An alternative approach to sensitivity analysis would be to ask: What piece of the model, 
if any, could be manipulated to produce a significant amount of total damages, say $100 
million or even just $10 million?  The dose response function is a key possibility.  The 
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small amount of uncertainty in the dose response function at the relevant but very low 
dose range is certainly understated.  The small range is due to the clustered high-dose 
data and the assumption of a quadratic does-response function.  These assumptions may 
not be accurate given that very little is known about the response to very small doses of 
BPA.64  In the base model, the standard deviation of the slope estimate for both types of 
cancer is less than 1% of the estimated mean.  Thus multiplying the slope by 100, 
although likely to be outside even the most conservative estimate of dose response, 
provides for a revision to the model that would sharply increase the estimated damages.  
The results of this experiment are shown in Chart 3.19.  Due to the nearly linear nature of 
the estimated dose response function, multiplying the slope parameter by 100 results in 
100 times the cancer frequency estimated in the primary model.  Therefore, under the 
new dose response function, there would be an estimated mean of 56 testicular cancers 
due to BPA each year and slightly more than one new cervicovaginal cancer per year.  
This would result in a total damage distribution with a mean of $33,200,000, and a 95% 
confidence interval ranging from $1,163,598 to $129,700,000.65  Though providing a 
wide range of large damages, scaling the dose-response function up by a factor of 100 
still produces damage estimates that are relatively small compared to other substances 
regulated by the federal government.         
 
8.  Concluding Remarks 
                                                          
64 In future versions of the model, it may be fruitful to estimate different, logical functional forms and make 
draws from the family of estimated curves. 
65 The uncertainties in the discount rate and the value of a statistical life become much more important in 
the range of the distribution when the number of cancer cases increase 100-fold.  
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This paper provides a comprehensive cost analysis, using risk assessment methodology, 
of the increased risk of testicular and cervicovaginal cancer to those exposed prenatally to 
current environmental levels Bisphenol-A.  The model used to calculate damages tracks 
variance throughout the model, including in the exposure parameters, the dose-response 
parameters, and the economic cost parameters.  Although uncertainty is a big issue in 
cutting edge risk assessment, no study to date has tracked variance and uncertainty from 
consumption to cost.  Indeed, using risk assessment methodology to calculate the 
economic costs of health risks is a fairly new technique. 
 
 The resulting estimated damage distribution is broad, with a mean of $332,377 and a 
95% confidence interval ranging from $11,347 to $1,304,023.  However, even if the true 
damages lie towards the upper tail, the benefits of BPA to the plastics industry and to 
consumers is likely to outweigh the health costs incurred by additional cases of testicular 
and cervicovaginal cancer.  There are two reasons for the relatively small amount of 
estimated damages.  First, people are exposed, on average to very small amounts of BPA 
every day.  So, based on the data available and the assumptions in the model, even for the 
most vulnerable population – fetuses -- there is very little risk of contracting a future case 
of cancer simply due to BPA exposure.  Even results produced with unrealistically 
conservative exposure estimates (that is, assuming exposure to an unrealistically large 
dose) resulted in very little additional risk of cancer due to BPA.  Second, the decreased 
health costs due to any regulation will not begin to be realized until nearly 35 years after 
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the regulation is put into place.  Thus any costs of current exposure are discounted to far 
in the future.  
 
The model illustrates the overall importance of tracking the uncertainty of every 
parameter in the model.  It turns out the damage estimate is very sensitive to the 
assumptions made on the value of a statistical life and the discount rate. The lack of 
variance in the dose-response estimation is of some concern.  The fact remains that very 
little is known about the effect of BPA at low doses (except that there probably is one) 
and the model does not accurately capture this uncertainty.  With highly clustered, high 
dose studies as the only data, most of the variance in the model is explained by the 
constant variable, the variable explaining the natural incidence rate. Removing the natural 
incidence rate mean and the variance around it correctly estimates the affects of BPA, but 
leaves very little variance for doses near zero.66 As new, lower dose data become 
available, this problem will become less severe.  Until then, a future version of this model 
should include dose response estimates for a variety of functional forms.  This would 
recapture some of the uncertainty lost when a single function is estimated.             
 
In the future, as data becomes available, besides refining the assumptions currently made 
on the estimated distributions and parameters, it would be interesting to add in a broader 
range of populations exposed to BPA, although they may be affected less severely than 
prenatal children.  Furthermore, although it would be unlikely to change the results 
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drastically, adding in the other non-fatal outcomes, some of which are precancerous 
conditions, would add complexity and rigor to the model that would be interesting from 
both a policy and a modeling point of view.     
                                                                                                                                                                             
66 Drawing a line or curve from the lowest observed dose through zero, as is typical in risk assessment, 
creates the same problem without correctly accounting for the natural incidence rate. 
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 Conclusion 
 
The results in Chapter I show clearly that productive investment is not crowded out by 
investment in pollution abatement capital in all industries.  For the lumber, chemicals, 
and primary metals industries in fact, it is safe to say that pollution abatement investment 
actually stimulates productive investment.  This result suggests economies of scope for 
investing in the two types of capital at the same time.  Furthermore, the results give 
empirical support to the Porter’s hypothesis and observation (1995) that firms tend to 
renovate when faced with environmental regulation.      
 
The results are even stronger in light of the assumption that λ is unaffected by investment 
in abatement equipment.  General equilibrium effects cause both interest rates and the 
price of capital goods to rise when firms demand abatement capital (Wilcoxen, 1988).  
These effects unambiguously lead to a reduction in productive investment.  Therefore, by 
ignoring them, the observed results are actually biased away from showing a positive 
correlation between abatement and productive investment.   
 
One possible explanation of this surprising result is the following:  If installing pollution 
abatement equipment requires a section of the plant to be shut down for a period of time, 
the firm may be able to replace nearby equipment at relatively little cost.   
 
Some caveats must be kept in mind.  With data aggregated to the 2-digit level, it is 
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impossible to see exactly what is happening at the plant or firm level.  Regional factors 
also cannot be observed.  This makes it difficult to say exactly what the mechanism is 
that drives the correlation.  It is possible that industries with a few dirty plants located in 
heavily regulated areas, may have closed those plants and opened new plants in different 
locations.  This would cause a large, positive correlation between abatement and 
productive investment at the industry level. That phenomenon would consistent with 
basic observation that abatement investment may stimulate productive investment but the 
mechanism would not be economies of scope in investment. 
 
Despite the caveats, the results remain very interesting.  At the industry level, abatement 
policy does not seem to crowd out otherwise productive investment in all industries.  On 
the contrary, abatement investment seems to provide an incentive in some industries (via 
economies of scope) for firms to renovate sooner, and in greater quantities than they 
normally would. (This does not necessarily imply that individual firms are made better 
off by regulation, just that in aggregate, their investment rises.)  Furthermore, the results 
show that care must be taken when designing policy affecting a large, aggregate branch 
of the economy.  Since industries react to mandated abatement investment differently, the 
effect on investment in the productive capital stock of such regulation should be 
calculated separately for each industry.       
     
These results have implications beyond the range of this paper.  Finding economies of 
scope between other investment pairs will have strong implications for policies designed 
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to alter the composition of total investment.  In fact, it would be surprising if other types 
of investment did not interact in the adjustment cost function. 
 
In Chapter II, the consideration of harvest percentage introduces a formidable, 
interesting, and useful economic problem.  I’ve shown how a two instrument, a clear-cut 
tax couple with a lump sum tax or subsidy can be used to remedy an inefficiency where 
valuable forest amenity is underprovided by a firm that is harvesting too many trees too 
fast.  The taxes would be fairly easy to implement and could used in a wide variety of 
realistic situations.  Allowing each tax to take the form of a penalty or a refund allows 
will even allow for the use of the tax scheme to correct for overgrown forests therefore 
aiding in wild fire management, and to correct for rotation periods that may be too long 
when the forest is being managed for the benefit of wildlife needing a less mature habitat.      
 
The stylized numerical model shows the wide variety of conditions where the clear-cut 
tax and lump sum transfer could be used to achieve a socially optimal solution when the 
forest amenity is something like erosion control.  In the future, this model could be 
refined and expanded upon in many ways.  It would be interesting to consider different 
types of amenities.  For instance, when wild fire control is considered it becomes 
necessary keep the harvest fraction above zero. The externalities function with respect to 
the harvest fraction may, in this case, be U-shaped.  Thus it is possible a type harvest 
percentage subsidy would be optimal to entice a firm to maintain a forest that is 
unprofitable with respect to timber value.   
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Chapter III provides a comprehensive cost analysis, using risk assessment methodology, 
of the increased risk of testicular and cervicovaginal cancer to those exposed prenatally to 
current environmental levels Bisphenol-A.  The model used to calculate damages tracks 
variance throughout the model, including in the exposure parameters, the dose response 
parameters, and the economic cost parameters.  Although uncertainty is a big issue in 
cutting edge risk assessment, no study to date has tracked variance and uncertainty from 
consumption to cost.  Indeed, using risk assessment methodology to calculate the 
economic costs of health risks is a fairly new technique. 
 
 The resulting estimated damage distribution is broad, with a mean of $332,377 and a 
95% confidence interval ranging from $11,347 to $1,304,023.  However, even if the true 
damages lie towards the upper tail, the benefits of BPA to the plastics industry and to 
consumers is likely to outweigh the health costs incurred by additional cases of testicular 
and cervicovaginal cancer.  There are two reasons for the relatively small amount of 
estimated damages.  First, people are exposed, on average to very small amounts of BPA 
every day.  So, based on the data available and the assumptions in the model, even for the 
most vulnerable population -- fetuses -- there is very little risk of contracting a future case 
of cancer simply due to BPA exposure.  Even results produced with unrealistically 
conservative exposure estimates resulted in very little additional risk of cancer due to 
BPA.  Second, the decreased health costs due to any regulation will not begin to be 
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realized until nearly 35 years after the regulation is put into place.  Thus any costs of 
current exposure are discounted to far in the future.  
 
The model illustrates the overall importance of tracking the uncertainty of every 
parameter in the model.  It turns out the damage estimate is very sensitive to the 
assumptions made on the value of a statistical life and the discount rate.  The lack of 
variance in the dose-response estimation is of some concern.  The fact remains that very 
little is known about the effect of BPA at low doses (except that there probably is one) 
and the model does not accurately capture this uncertainty.  With highly clustered, high 
dose studies as the only data, most of the variance in the model is explained by the 
constant variable, the variable explaining the natural incidence rate. Removing the natural 
incidence rate mean and the variance around it correctly estimates the affects of BPA, but 
leaves very little variance for doses near zero. As new, lower dose data become available, 
this problem will become less severe.  Until then, a future version of this model should 
include dose response estimates for a variety of functional forms.  This would recapture 
some of the uncertainty lost when a single function is estimated.             
 
In the future, as data becomes available, besides refining the assumptions currently made 
on the estimated distributions and parameters, it would be interesting to add in a broader 
range of populations exposed to BPA, although they may be affected less severely than 
prenatal children.  Furthermore, although it would be unlikely to change the results 
drastically, adding in the other non-fatal outcomes, some of which are precancerous 
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conditions, would add information, complexity and rigor to the model that would be 
interesting from both a policy and a modeling point of view.     
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.1:  Manufacturing Industries  
SIC Description     SIC Description 
20 Food      30 Rubber and plastic products 
22 Textile mill products    32 Stone, clay, and glass products 
24 Lumber and wood products   33 Primary Metals 
25 Furniture and fixtures    34 Fabricated metal products  
26 Paper and allied products    35 Machinery, except electrical  
27 Printing and publishing    36 Electrical machinery   
28 Chemicals and allied products   37 Transportation Equipment 
29 Petroleum refining    38 Instruments 
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Figure 1.1:  Correlation Between Productive and Abatement Investment (1973-
1993)
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Figure 1.2:  Abatement Investment as Percentage of Total Investment, by 
Industry
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Figure 1.3:  Variances (in millions) in Measured Productive and 
Abatement Investment by Industry 
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Figure 1.4:  % Change in Productive and Abatement Investment for All 
Industries Between 1973 and 1993
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Figure 1.5:  Abatement Coefficents and 95% Confidence Intervals by Industry
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Table 1.2: Regression Results 
Coefficient Estimate   Standard Error  Coefficient Estimate   Standard Error 
b0  1547.399 * 200.0787  Industry Dummies 
Ia  Coefficient by Industry (1973-1979)   Food 3700.91 * 441.99 
Food -2.61 * 1.29  Lumber  65.67  268.78 
Textiles -1.70   2.43  Furniture  -1019.06 * 220.43 
Lumber  6.53 * 1.32  Paper 2844.62 * 632.49 
Furniture  1.16   2.49  Printing  892.80 * 366.62 
Paper -0.60   0.74  Chemicals 3490.91 * 535.48 
Printing  -10.76   8.81  Petroleum 2948.89 * 480.28 
Chemicals 3.93 * 0.44  Rubber -118.12  340.04 
Petroleum -0.10   0.44  Stone 1024.40 * 398.74 
Rubber 1.51   5.63  Pri metals 1623.50 * 565.49 
Stone 1.34   1.05  Fab metals 2524.16 * 479.97 
Pri metals 1.72 * 0.34  Machinery 7105.70 * 726.82 
Fab metals -3.32  3.56  Elec mach 5181.20 * 1282.37 
Machinery -3.34   6.52  Trans equip 2983.83 * 1051.28 
Elec mach -19.10  14.37  Instruments -478.19 * 321.10 
Trans equip 7.46   4.82  Interactive Dummies (S&P with Industry) 
Instruments -12.39 * 5.98  Food 6.76 * 1.57 
Difference in Ia  Coefficient Over Later Sub-
period (1980 – 1993)    Textiles 1.58 * 0.65 
Food 3.85 * 1.11  Lumber  -1.22   0.74 
Textiles -0.40   2.62  Furniture  0.60  0.47 
Lumber  -2.06   1.60  Paper -0.98   3.90 
Furniture  1.44   4.13  Printing  2.07  1.57 
Paper 4.97 * 0.90  Chemicals -4.19   3.62 
Printing  47.56 * 8.32  Petroleum -10.11 * 2.47 
Chemicals 1.98 * 0.41  Rubber 6.08 * 2.02 
Petroleum 2.35 * 0.42  Stone -1.75  1.09 
Rubber 5.66   5.06  Pri metals 0.22   1.55 
Stone 0.31   1.48  Fab metals -0.01  1.44 
Pri metals 1.33 * 0.48  Machinery -12.44 * 3.20 
Fab metals 2.31   2.03  Elec mach -3.00  4.18 
Machinery 22.75 * 5.38  Trans equip 2.78   3.55 
Elec mach 33.33 * 5.54  Instruments 5.15 * 1.69 
Trans equip 5.51   3.39  Χ2(63) 11657.86 *   
Instruments 25.48 * 4.74      
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Figure 2.1:  Stylized Growth Function of Forest Acre
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Years
To
ta
l B
oa
rd
fe
et
/A
cr
e
 
  109
Figure 2.2: Optimal Rotation Periods and Harvest Percentages for Different 
Discount Rates and γ = $0.02
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Figure 2.3:  Optimal Rotation Periods and Harvest Percentages for Different 
Marginal Amenity Values and r = 3%
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Table 2.1:  Effect of  r  and  γ  On Tax Rates and 
Penalties 
r τcc (rate) τcc*H2 (penalty) τls 
1% $22,944 $22,944 -$10,234
2% $29,522 $16,166 -$10,539
3% $37,444 $11,327 -$8,891
4% $47,014 $8,293 -$6,946
5% $58,534 $5,625 -$5,219
6% $72,292 $4,164 -$3,832
7% $88,541 $2,869 -$2,771
8% $107,449 $2,106 -$1,982
9% $129,030 $1,561 -$1,404
10% $153,050 $980 -$986
      
γ τcc (rate) τcc*H2 (penalty) τls 
0.02 $37,443.75 $11,326.73 -$8,890.93
0.04 $74,887.49 $5,871.18 -$4,445.47
0.08 $149,774.98 $2,935.59 -$2,222.73
0.32 $299,549.97 $1,467.79 -$1,111.37
0.64 $599,099.94 $539.19 -$555.68
1.28 $1,198,199.87 $479.28 -$277.84
2.56 $2,396,399.74 $0.00 -$138.92
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Table 3.1:  Expenditure an Consumption of Goods (included in the 1996 CEX     
Diary Survey) Containing BPA by Consuming Women (age 18-40 years) 
    
Good 
Mean 
Expenditure (in 
$)/ 14 days Average Price/Unit 
Mean 
Consumption 
(units per day) 
% of Women who 
Consume Zero 
Units on Average 
Canned Food 4.03  (3.56) 0.69 0.42  (0.37) 61% 
Soft Drinks 3.54 (2.63) 0.33 0.77  (0.57) 55% 
Note:  Number in parentheses are standard errors   
 
 
 
Table 3.2:  Average Daily Ingestion of BPA by 
Product  
statistics produced via Monte Carlo simulation 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
canned food 1.24 2.40 
dental sealant 5.25E-03 3.70E-04 
bottled water 0.50 0.44 
tupperware 4.33 4.30 
canned juice 0.86 1.85 
soft drinks 0.06 0.11 
tap water 1.03 0.77 
 
 
  112
 
 
 
Table 3.3:  Dose Response Function Regression Results 
       
Testicular Cancer     
  Coefficient Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval 
constant 0.0005985 0.000523 -0.0004271 0.001624 
dose 3.60E-06 1.37E-07 3.34E-06 3.87E-06 
dose^2 -1.54E-10 6.06E-12 -1.66E-10 -1.42E-10 
       
Cervicovaginal 
Cancer     
  Coefficient Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval 
constant 0.0005454 0.000066 0.0004161 0.0006748 
dose 8.06E-08 1.54E-08 5.04E-08 1.11E-07 
dose^2 -3.31E-12 6.23E-13 -4.53E-12 -2.09E-12 
 
 
 µg/day 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 
0 
.01 
.02 
.03 
.04 
.05 Figure 3.1:Distribution of Average BPA 
Ingestion by Women in the U.S. 
Mean = 8.0 
Standard Deviation = 5.4 
95% CI = 1.2 to 21.2 
  
Fraction 
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Figure 3.2:  Dose Response Function for Cervicovaginal Cancer 
with Upper and Lower Bounds (95% Confidence Interval)
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Figure 3.3:  Dose Response Function (low doses) for 
Cervicovaginal Cancer with Upper and Lower Bounds (95% 
Confidence Interval)
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Figure 3.4:  Dose Response Function for Testicular Cancer with 
Upper and Lower Bounds (95% Confidence Interval)
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
0
20
00
40
00
60
00
80
00
10
00
0
12
00
0
14
00
0
16
00
0
18
00
0
20
00
0
22
00
0
24
00
0
100's of micrograms of BPA
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
of
 T
es
t. 
C
an
ce
r
 
Figure 3.5:  Dose Response Function (low doses) for Testicular 
Cancer with Upper an Lower Bounds (95% Confidence Interval)
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Fraction 
Figure 3.6: Distribution of the Frequency of Testicular 
Cancer Due to Average BPA Exposure 
Mean = 2.82e-07 
Standard Deviation = 1.94e-07 
95% CI = 6.00e-08 to 6.50e-07 
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Figure 3.7: Distribution of the Frequency of Cervicovaginal 
Cancer Due to Average BPA Exposure 
Mean = 6.16e-09 
Standard Deviation = 6.23e-08 
95% CI = 0 to 2.00e-08 
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Figure 3.8: Distribution of New Cases of 
Testicular Cancer per Year 
In the U.S. Due to BPA Exposure 
Mean =  0.57 
Standard Deviation = 0.39 
95% CI = 0.11 to 1.31 
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Figure 3.9: Distribution of New Cases of 
Cervocivaginal Cancer per Year 
In the U.S. Due to BPA Exposure 
Mean =  0.01 
Standard Deviation = 0.01 
95% CI = 0 to 0.03 
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Table 3.4:  Summary of Mortality Estimates Used in 
the EPA's, "The Benefits of the Clean Air Act, 1990 - 2010"  
    
Keisner and Leeth (1991) 0.7 
Smith and Gilbert (1984) 0.9 
Dillingham (1985) 1.1 
Butler (1983) 1.4 
Miller and Guria (1991) 1.5 
Moore and Guria (1988a) 3.1 
Landefeld (1979)** 3.2 
Viscusi, Magat, and Huber (1991b) 3.3 
Gegax et. al. (1985) 4.1 
Marin and Psacharopoulos (1982) 3.5 
Kneiser and Leeth (1991) (Australia) 4.1 
Gerking, de Haan, and Schulze (1988) 4.2 
Cousineau, Lacroix, and Girard (1988) 4.5 
Jones-Lee (1989) 4.7 
Dillingham (1985) 4.8 
Viscusi (1978, 1979) 5.1 
R.S. Smith (1976) 5.7 
V.K. Smith (1976) 5.8 
Olson (1981) 6.4 
Viscusi (1981) 8.0 
R.S. Smith (1974) 8.9 
Moore and Viscusi (1988a) 9.0 
Kneiser and Leeth (1991) (Japan) 9.4 
Herzog and Schlottman (1987) 11.3 
Leigh and Folson (1984) 12.0 
Leigh (1987) 12.9 
Garen (1988) 16.7 
    
** not listed in EPA report   
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Figure 3.10: Distribution of the Cost per 
New Case of Testicular Cancer 
In the U.S.  
(in Year 2000 $) 
Mean =  433,677 
Standard Deviation = 353,465 
95% CI = 139,151 to 968,004 
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Figure 3.11: Distribution of the Cost per 
New Case of Cervicovaginal Cancer 
In the U.S.  
(in Year 2000 $) 
Mean =  2,147,492 
Standard Deviation = 1,502,255 
95% CI = 1,447,448 to 4,497,910 
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Table 3.6:  Results of Simulation on Damages  
Due to BPA Exposure (in year 2000 $) 
Total Costs, All Time, Discounted 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 95% Confidence Interval 
Total 332,377 690,776 11,347 1,304,023 
Testicular Cancer 261,538 633,165 2167 1,114,465 
Cervicovaginal Cancer 70,838 136,152 1919 259,614 
Annual Costs 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 95% Confidence Interval 
Total 271,791 294,349 43,808 748,139 
Testicular Cancer 244,573 277,575 30,980 694,868 
Cervicovaginal Cancer 27,218 31,204 4221 73,741 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12: Distribution of Total Damages 
Due to New BPA Related Cases of Cancer 
In the United States  
(In Year 2000 $) 
Mean = 332,377 
Standard Deviation = 690,776 
95% CI = 11,347 to 1,304,023 
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Figure 3.13: Distribution of Undiscounted Annual 
 Damages Due to New BPA Related Cases  
of Cancer In the United States  
(In Year 2000 $) 
Mean = 271,791  
Standard Deviation = 294,349 
95% CI = 43,808 to 748,139 
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Figure 3.14: Distribution of Total Damages 
Due to New BPA Related Cases of Cancer 
In the United States 
When r = 7%  
(In Year 2000 $) 
Mean = 178,977 (53.8% of baseline mean) 
Standard Deviation = 328,242 
95% CI = 11,116 to 639,719 
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Figure 3.15: Distribution of Total Damages 
Due to New BPA Related Cases of Cancer 
In the United States 
When r = 3%  
(In Year 2000 $) 
Mean = 1,991,183 (599% of baseline mean) 
Standard Deviation = 2,604,635 
95% CI = 259,177 to 6,022,751 
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Figure 3.16: Distribution of Total Damages 
Due to New BPA Related Cases of Cancer 
In the United States 
When VSL = 12,500,000 (95th percentile)  
(In Year 2000 $) 
Mean = 680,396 (205% of baseline mean) 
Standard Deviation = 1,155,320 
95% CI = 28,839 to 2,639,119 
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Figure 3.17: Distribution of Total Damages 
Due to New BPA Related Cases of Cancer 
In the United States 
When VSL = 5,788,000 (50th percentile)  
(In Year 2000 $) 
Mean = 330,509 (99% of baseline mean) 
Standard Deviation = 560,216 
95% CI = 13,961 to 1,277,449 
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Figure 3.18: Distribution of Total Damages 
Due to New BPA Related Cases of Cancer 
In the United States 
When I = 25µg/day (99th percentile)  
(In Year 2000 $) 
Mean = 1,049,056 (316% of baseline mean) 
Standard Deviation = 1,948,469 
95% CI = 65,714 to 3,840,583 
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Table 3.7: BPA Leached into Canned Food                   
(Brotons et al., 1995) 
Food mL of liquid Mean BPA in Food (µg/can) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Peas 50 22.9 8.8 
Artichokes 150 18.6 6.5 
Green beans 190 11.9 5.3 
Mixed 
vegetables 220 10.1 4.3 
Corn 15 4.5 2.6 
Mushrooms 145 4.2 4.1 
Asparagus 80 Not Detectable - 
Palm hearts 280 Not Detectable - 
Peppers 140 Not Detectable - 
Tomatoes 140 Not Detectable - 
 
Figure 3.19: Distribution of Total Damages 
Due to New BPA Related Cases of Cancer 
In the United States 
When dose response slope  
is multiplied by 100  
(In Year 2000 $) 
Mean = 33,200,000 
Standard Deviation = 68,900,000 
95% CI = 1,163,598 to 129,700,000 
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix A   
Deriving the First Order Conditions for the General Model of Investment Over n-
types of Capital 
 
The model in Part 2 of the Chapter 1 is an optimal control problem, so the first order 
conditions can be found by differentiating the following Hamiltonian: 
(A1)                            { } )KI(eIP)W,I,K(H )t(Rk δ−Λ+−π= −  
This yields the following first order conditions: 
(A2)    0e)P(H )t(RkII =Λ+−π∇⇒ −                                                 
(A3)     
•− Λ−=δΛ−π∇⇒ )t(RKK e)(H    
(A4)                            KIKH δ−=⇒ •Λ  
 
Making use of the current value transormation of  Λ, the first order conditions are 
rewritten in the following manner: 
(A5)                  π∇−=λ IkP  
(A6)                                             π−∇=δ+λ−λ• K)rJ(  
(A7)     KIK δ−=•  
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To better interpret these first order conditions, (A6) is integrated along the optimal paths 
of I and K.  This yields: 
(A8)                         ∫∞ +−∞+∞− ∇−=−∞
0
))(())(( )0()( tJtRK
JR ee δδ πλλ  
 
To simplify further, a set of transversality conditions is used: 
 
(A9)                                     0e)t(lim,...j )tjj)t(R(j
t
=λ∀ δ−−∞→  
 
Applying (ix) to (viii), the FOC's can now be rewritten as they appear in Section 2 of 
Chapter 1. 
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Appendix B 
Differentiation of  φ(I)  With Respect to  Ip 
 
Assume φ(I) takes the quadratic form: 
 
(B1)                                                 I'II')I( Γ+γ+α=φ  
 
Where: 
(B2)    

=
a
p
I
I
I    (B3)    [ ]ap' γγ=γ     (B4)     ΓΓ
ΓΓ=Γ
aaap
papp     
 
Thus: 
 
(B5)                                 [ ] [ ]  ΓΓ
ΓΓ+

γγ+α=φ
a
p
aaap
papp
ap
a
p
ap I
I
II
I
I
)I(  
 
Multiplying (B5) out gives 
 
(B6)   2aaaapap
2
pppaapp III2III)I( Γ+Γ+Γ+γ+γ+α=φ     
 
Taking the partial derivative with respect to Ip yields the expression for ∂φ(I)/∂Ip found in 
Section 3 of the Chapter I. 
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Appendix C 
Additional Demographic Groups Potentially Affected by Bisphenol-A 
There is no question that the fetus is uniquely vulnerable to disturbances in estrogen 
levels.  However, some studies show that additional groups may also be susceptible, 
albeit less so, to adverse outcomes due to BPA exposure.  For example, rapidly 
developing neonates, exposed to BPA in some baby bottles, may be vulnerable.  Neonatal 
estrogen treatment has been shown to cause deformities and precancerous conditions in 
female mice and rats (Forsberg, 1979, Bern et. al., 1987 Medlock, et. al., 1988, Brody 
and Cunha, 1989).  Furthermore, though the National Research Council (1999) states that 
the results of exposure to BPA as an adult are at worst transitory, there is evidence 
linking adult estrogen treatment to endometrial cancer (Ziel, et. al., 1975).  Adult 
exposure to exogenous estrogen may also promote malignant breast tumor growth 
(Dickson, et. al., 1986).   
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Appendix D 
Additional Adverse Outcomes Associated with Bisphenol-A 
Cancers known to be caused by prenatal exogenous estrogen exposure were chosen as the 
focus of this study due to data considerations and their relative importance and cost. 
However, Bisphenol-A also may lead to infertility through reduced sperm production or 
genital tract deformation.  It causes increased prostate size of male offspring when 
environmentally relevant doses are fed to pregnant female mice (Nagel, et. al., 1997).  It 
also increases testis weight and reduces daily sperm production in male offspring of 
pregnant mice fed BPA (vom Saal et. al., 1998).   Bisphenol-A induces hyperprolactimia 
in some genetically predisposed rats (Steinmetz et. al, 1997).  BPA is also linked to 
abnormalities in behavior and sexuality in mice (vom Saal, et. al., 1998). 
 
Studies using other estrogen-like chemicals link increased hormone levels at critical 
periods of fetal development to female genital tract deformation, such as lesions on and 
malformation of the uterus, cervix, ovaries, and vagina, as well as infertility and 
premature birth in future generations (Herbst et. al., 1971, Forsberg, 1979, McLachlan, 
1979, Barnes et. al., 1980, Cousins et. al., 1980, Newbold et. al., 1982, Thorpe et. al., 
1990, Greco et. al., 1993).  Prenatal exogenous estrogen exposure is also linked prostate 
enlargement, cryporchisdism, hypospadias, and reduced sperm count and efficiency in 
humans (Bullock, et. al., 1988, vom Saal, et. al., 1997, vom Saal, et. al.,  1998).   
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It is also possible that BPA exposure may be linked other types of cancer, but at this 
point, no hard evidence has been produced.    
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Appendix E 
Calibration of Leaching Parameters 
For canned food, data from Brotons, et. al. (1998), shown in Table 3-E1 is used.  Since 
consumption of a particular type of canned good is difficult to untangle using existing 
data, the leaching data from Brotons is averaged.  For peas, artichokes, green beans, 
mixed vegetables, corn, and mushrooms, the leaching distribution is assumed to be 
lognormal.  For canned food where the amount leached into food is undetectable, 
asparagus, palm hearts, peppers, and tomatoes, the leaching distribution is assumed to be 
uniform between 0 and the detection limit of 5 µg/mL.  In each round of 25,000 draws, 
draws are taken from each distribution individually and summed.  This number is divided 
by 10 to provide the average amount leached from an average can of food.  
 
For dental sealant, data from Olea, et. al. (1996) is used.  Olea finds between 89.8 and 
931 µg of BPA in the saliva of patients one hour after the application of 50 mg of sealant.  
However, Fung, et. al. (2000) points out that a typical tooth only requires 8 mg of sealant.  
Therefore the upper and lower bounds on BPA leaching as estimated by Olea are scaled 
by a factor of 6.25.  Thus a uniform distribution ranging from 14.37 µg/tooth to 148.96 
µg/tooth is used.  
 
To calibrate the rest of the leaching parameters, data from Takao, et. al. (1999) is used.  
Takao finds less than 1 ppb in autoclaved soft drink cans.  Under the assumption that soft 
drink can holds 12 fluid ounces, 1 ppb is converted to micrograms to form the upper 
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bound of a uniform distribution ranging between 0 µg/can and 0.34 µg/can leached.  
Bottled water is assumed to have the same leaching rate as the 0 to 6.5 ppb range detected 
in polycarbonate baby bottles.  The range is scaled to calculate the uniform range (0 µg to 
1.48 µg) that could be found in an 8 ounce serving.  Tap water is assumed to have the 
same amount of BPA as the 0 to 2.4 ppb range found in river water samples. The uniform 
range of 0 µg to 0.54 µg that is used in the model is calculated by again scaling to an 8 
ounce serving.  Plastic ware is also assumed to have the same leaching rate detected in 
polycarbonate baby bottles.  The uniform range of 0 µg to 23.4 µg per container is 
calculated by scaling the polycarbonate bottle data to represent the amount that could be 
found in a container ranging in size between 0.23 cups to 15 cups.  Containers of any size 
in this range are assumed to have an equal likelihood of being used at any given time.  
Canned fruit juice can come in containers resembling food cans or soft drink cans. 
Therefore leaching from canned juice is assumed to be the average of the amount leached 
from a canned food and the amount leached from a soft drink can.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  132
References 
 
American Dental Association (1990), “The 1990 Survey of Dental Services Rendered,” 
American Dental Association.  
 
Benign Prostatic Hyperplasia:  Diagnosis and Treatment, Clinical Practice Guideline No. 
8.  AHCPR Pub. No. 94-0582:  February 1994.  
 
Bern, H.A., (1992), “The Fragile Fetus,” Chemically Induced Alterations in Sexual and 
Functional Development:  The Wildlife/Human Connection, Princeton:  Princeton 
Scientific Publishing Co., pp. 9-15. 
 
Blanchard, O.J., and Fischer, S., (1989), Lectures on Macroeconomics.  Cambridge:  The  
 
MIT Press. 
 
 
Brotons, A.B., Olea-Serrano, M.F., Villalobos, M., Pedraza, V., and Olea, N. (1995), 
“Xenoestrogens Released from Lacquer Coatings in Food Cans,” Environmental 
Health Perspectives, 103, pp. 608-612. 
 
Bullock, B.C., Newbold, R.R., and McLachlan, J.A. (1988), “Lesions of Testis and 
Epididymis Associated with Prenatal Diethylstilbestrol Exposure,” Environmental 
Health Perspectives, vol 77, pp. 29-31. 
  133
 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (1999), “1996 Diary Survey,” Public Use Microdata. 
 
Chang, S.J., (1982),  “An economic analysis of forest taxation’s impact on the optimal 
rotation age,” Land Economics, vol. 58, pp. 310-323.   
 
Christiansen, G.B. and Haveman, R.H., (1981), “The Contribution of Environmental 
Regulations to the Slowdown of Productivity Growth,”  Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management, vol. 8, pp. 381-390. 
 
Clark, P.K. (1978),  “Capital Formation and the Recent Productivity Slowdown,”  
Journal of Finance, vol. 33, (June), pp. 965-975. 
 
Conrad, K., and Morrison, C.J., (1989),  “The Impact of Pollution Abatement Investment 
on Productivity Change:  An Empirical Comparison of the U.S., Germany, and 
Canada,”  Southern Economic Journal, vol. 55, no. 3, (January), pp.  684-698. 
 
Cousins, L., Karp, W., Lacey, C., and Lucas, W., (1980), “Reproductive Outcome of 
Women Exposed to Diethylstilbestrol In Utero,” Obstetrics and Gynecology, vol. 
56, no. 1, pp. 70-76.   
 
Crabbe, P.J. and Van Long, N. (1989),  “Optimal Forest Rotation under Monopoly and 
  134
Competition,”  Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,  vol. 17, 
pp. 54-65.  
 
Denison, E.F. (1979), Accounting for Slower Economic Growth, The Brookings 
Institution. 
 
Depue, R.H., Pike, M.C., and Henderson, B.E. (1983), “Estrogen Exposure During 
Gestation and Risk of Testicular Cancer,” Journal of the National Cancer 
Institute, vol. 71, no. 6, pp. 1151-1155. 
 
Doornik, J.A., (1999), Object-Oriented Matrix Programming Using Ox, 3rd ed. London: 
Timberlake Consultants Press and Oxford:  www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Users/Doornik. 
 
Driscoll, S.G., Taylor, S.H., (1980), “Effects of Prenatal Maternal Estrogen on the Male 
Urogenital System,” Obstetrics and Gynecology, vol. 56, no. 5, pp. 537-542.   
 
Environmental Protection Agency (1999), “The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act 
1990 to 2010”, EPA-410-R-99-001. 
 
Etzioni, R., Ramsey, S.D., Berry, K., Brown, M., (2001), “The Impact of Including 
Future Medical Care Costs When Estimating the Costs Attributable to a Disease:  
A Colorectal Cancer Case Study,”  Health Economics, 10, pp. 245-256. 
  135
 
Fireman, B.H., Quesenberry, C.P., Somkin, C.P., Jacobsen, A.S., Baer, D., West, D., 
Potosky, A.L., Brown, M.L., (1997), “Cost of Care for Cancer in a Health 
Maintenance Organization,” Health Care Financing Review, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 
51-76.   
 
Forsberg, J. (1979), “Developmental Mechanism of Estrogen-Induced Irreversible 
Changes in the Mouse Cervicovaginal Epithelium,” National Cancer Institute 
Monograph, 51, pp. 41-56. 
 
Fung, E.Y.K., Ewoldsen, N.O., St. Germain Jr., H.A., Marx, D.B., Chang-Ling, M., 
Siew, C., Chou, H., Gruninger, S.E., and Meyer, D.M. (2000), “Pharmacokinetics 
of Bisphenol A Released from a Dental Sealant,”  Journal of the American Dental 
Association, vol. 131, pp. 51-58. 
 
Gill, W.B., Schumacher, M.B., Straus, F.H., and Schoenberg, H.W. (1979), “Association 
of Diethylstilbestrol Exposure In Utero with Cryptorchidism, Testicular 
Hypoplasia and Semen Abnormalities,” The Journal of Urology, vol. 122, pp. 36-
39.  
 
Gray, W.B., and Shadbegian, R.J., (1998),  “Environmental Regulation, Investment 
Timing, and Technology Choice, The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 46, 
  136
no. 2, pp. 235-256. 
 
Greco, T.L., Duello, T.M., and Gorski, J. (1993), “Estrogen Receptors, Estradiol, and 
Diethylstilbestrol in Early Development: The Mouse as a Model for the Study of 
Estrogen Receptors and Estrogen Sensitivity in Embryonic Development of Male 
and Female Reproductive Tracts,” Endocrine Reviews, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 59-71. 
 
Greene, W.H. (1997),  Econometric Analysis, 3rd ed.  New Jersey:  Prentice-Hall, Inc.. 
 
Griffiths, C.W., Dockins, C., Owens, N., Simon, N.B., and Axelrad, D.A. (2002), “What 
to Do at Low Doses:  A Bounding Approach for Economic Analysis,”  Risk 
Analysis, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 679-688.  
 
Hammermesh, D.S. and Pfann, G.A., (1996),  “Adjustment Costs in Factor Demand,”  
Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 34, (September), pp. 1264-1292. 
 
Hartman, R., (1988),  “The harvesting decision when the standing forest has value,” 
Economic Inquiry,  vol. 14, pp. 52-58.  
 
Hatch, E.E., Palmer, J.R., Titus-Ernstoff, L., Noller, K.L., Kaufman, R.H., Mittendorf, 
R., Robboy, S.J., Hyer, M., Cowan, C.M., Adam, E., Colton, T., Harte, P., and 
Hoover, R.N. (1998), “Cancer Risk in Women Exposed to Diethylstibestrol In 
  137
Utero,”  Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 280, no. 7, pp. 630-
634. 
 
Hayashi, F. (1982),  “Tobin’s Marginal q and Average q:  A Neoclassical Interpretation,”  
Econometrica, 50(1), pp. 213-224. 
 
Henderson, B.E., Benton, B., Jing, J., Yu, M.C., and Pike, M.C. (1979), “Risk Factors for 
Cancer of the Testis of Young Men,” International Journal of Cancer, 23, pp. 
598-602. 
 
Herbst, A.L., Ulfelder, H., and Poskanzer, D.C. (1971), “Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina:  
Association of Maternal Stilbestrol Therapy and Tumor Appearance in Young 
Women,” The New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 284, no. 16, pp. 878-881. 
 
Herbst, A.L., Scully, R.E., and Robboy, S.J. (1979), “Prenatal Diethylstilbestrol Exposure 
and Human Genital Tract Abnormalities,” National Cancer Institute Monograph, 
51, pp. 25-35.  
 
Howe, S. R., Borodinsky, L., and Roy, S. L. (1998), “Potential Exposure to Bisphenol A 
from Food-Contact Use of Epoxy Coated Cans,” Journal of Coatings Technology, 
vol. 70, no. 877, pp. 69-74. 
 
  138
Johnson, L.D., Driscoll, S.G., Hertig, A.T., Cole, P.T., Nickerson, R.J., (1979), Vaginal 
Adenosis in Stillborns and Neonates Exposed to Diethylstilbestrol and Steroidal 
Estrogens and Progestins,” Obstetrics and Gynecology, (1979), vol. 53, no. 6, pp. 
671-679. 
 
Kaufman, R.H., Adam, E., Binder, G.L., and Gerthoffer, E., (1980), “Upper Genital Tract 
Changes and Pregnancy Outcome in Offspring Exposed In Utero to 
Diethylstilbestrol,”  American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, vol. 137, 
no. 3, pp. 299-308.  
 
Krishnan, A.V., Stathis, P., Permuth, S.F., Tokes, L., and Feldman, D. (1993), 
“Bisphenol-A:  An Estrogenic Substance Is Released from Polycarbonate Flasks 
during Autoclaving,” Endocrinology, vol. 132, no. 6, pp. 2279-2286. 
 
Landefeld, J.S. (1979), “Control of New Materials with Carcinogenic Potential:  An 
Economic Analysis,” College Park, MD: University of Maryland, mimeo. 
 
Landefeld, J.S., and Seskin, E.P. (1982), “The Economic Value of Life:  Linking Theory 
and Practice,”  American Journal of Public Health, vol. 72, pp. 555-561.  
 
Law, A.M, and Kelton, W.D. (2000), Simulation Modeling and Analysis, 3rd ed.  Boston: 
McGraw-Hill. 
  139
 
Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs and Texas Health Care Information Council 
(2001), The Cost of Cancer in Texas: A Report to the Texas Comprehensive 
Cancer Control Coalition on the Economic Impact of Cancer.  
 
Marks, R.E. (1991),  “The Cost of Australian Carbon Dioxide Abatement,”  Energy 
Journal,  vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 135-152. 
 
Max, W and Lehman, D., (1988),  “A Behavioral Model of Timber Supply,”  Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management,  vol. 15, pp. 77-86.   
 
McArdle, R., “ The Yield of Douglas Fir in the Pacific Northwest,”  USDA Technical 
Bulletin, No. 201. 
 
McLachlan, J.A. (1979), “Productive Tract Lesions in Male Mice Exposed Prenatally to 
Diethylstilbestrol,” Science, vol. 190, pp. 991-992. 
 
McLachlan, J.A. (1979), “Transplacental Effects of Diethylstilbestrol in Mice,” National 
Cancer Institute Monograph, 51, pp. 67-72.  
 
Mountfort, K.A., Kelly, J., Jickels, S.M., and Castle, L. (1997), “Investigations into the 
Potential Degradation of Polycarbonate Baby Bottles During Sterilization with 
  140
Consequent Release of Bisphenol A,” Food Additives and Contaminants, vol. 14, 
pp. 737-740. 
 
Nagel, S.C., vom Saal, F.S., Thayer, K.A., Minati, G.D., Boechler, M., and Welshons, 
W.V. (1997), “Relative Binding Affinity-Serum Modified Access (RBA-SMA) 
Assay Predicts the Relative Binding In Vivo of the Xenoestrogens Bisphenol A 
and Octylphenol,” Environmental Health Perspectives, vol. 105, no. 1, pp. 70-76. 
 
Nandi, S., Guzman, R.C., and Yang, J. (1995), “Hormones and mammary carcinogenesis  
in mice, rats, and humans:  A unifying hypothesis,”  Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Science, vol. 92, pp. 3650 -3657. 
 
National Cancer Institute (2003), Surveillance Epidemiology and End Results, 
http://www.seer.cancer.gov/. 
 
National Institute of Health (2003), “Disease-Specific Estimates of Direct and Indirect 
Costs of Illness and NIH Support,” http://www1.od.nih.gov/osp/ospp/ 
ecostudies/appendix.htm 
 
National Research Council (1999), Hormonally Active Agents in the Environment.  
Washington D.C.:  National Academy Press. 
 
  141
Newbold, R. R., Bullock, B.C., and McLachlan, J.A., (1982), “Vaginal Adenosis and 
Adenocarcinoma in Mice Exposed Prenatally or Neonatally to Diethylstilbestrol,”  
Cancer Research, vol. 42, pp. 2003-2011. 
 
Newbold, R. R., Bullock, B.C., and McLachlan, J.A., (1983), “Exposure to 
Diethylstilbestrol During Pregnancy Permanently Alters the Ovary and Oviduct,”  
Biology of Reproduction, vol. 28, pp. 735-744. 
 
Newbold, R. R., Bullock, B.C., and McLachlan, J.A., (1987), “Lesions of the Rete Testis 
in Mice Exposed Prenatally to Diethylstilbestrol,”  Cancer Research, vol. 45, pp. 
5145-5150. 
 
Newbold, R. R., Bullock, B.C., and McLachlan, J.A., (1987), “Testicular Tumors In Mice 
Exposed In Utero to Diethylstilbestrol,”  The Journal of Urology, vol. 138, pp. 
1446-1450. 
 
Norsworthy, J.R., Harper, M.J., and Kunze, K., (1979),  “The Slowdown in Productivity 
Growth:  Analysis of Some Contributing Factors,”  Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, no. 2, pp. 387-421. 
 
Office of Management and Budget (1992), “Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-
Cost Analysis of Federal Programs”, OMB Circular A-94.  
  142
 
Olea, N., Pulgar, R., Perez, P., Olea-Serrano, F., Rivas., A., Novilla-Fertrell, A., Pedraza, 
V., Soto, A.M., and Sonnenschein, C. (1996), “Estrogenicity of Resin-based 
Composites and Sealants Used in Dentistry,”  Environmental Health Perspectives, 
vol. 104, no. 3, pp. 298-305.  
 
Porter, M.E., and Linde, C., (1995),  “Toward a New Conception of the Environment-
Competitiveness Relationship,”  Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 9, no. 4, 
pp. 97-118. 
 
Riley, G.F., Potosky, A.L., Lubitz, J.D., and Kessler, L.G., (1995), “Medicare Payments 
from Diagnosis to Death for Elderly Cancer Patients by Stage at Diagnosis,” 
Medical Care, vol. 33, no. 8, pp. 828-841. 
 
Robboy, S.J., Kaufman, R.H., Prat, J., Welch, W.R., Gaffey, T., Scully, R.E., Richart, R., 
Fenoglio, C.M., Virata, R., and Tilley, B.C., (1979), “Pathologic Findings in 
Young Women Enrolled in the National Cooperative Diethylstilbestrol Adenosis 
(DESAD) Project,”  Obstetrics and Gynecology, vol. 53, no. 3, pp. 309-317. 
 
Rustia, M. (1979), “Role of Hormone Imbalance in Transplacental Carcinogenesis 
Induced in Syrian Golden Hamsters by Sex Hormones,” National Cancer Institute 
Monograph, 51, pp. 77-87.  
  143
 
Samuelson, P., (1976), “Economics of forestry in an evolving society,”  Economic 
Inquiry, vol. 14, pp. 466-492.  
 
Sandberg, E.C. (1975), “Benign Cervical and Vaginal Changes Associated with Exposure 
to Stilbestrol In Utero,” American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, vol. 
125, no. 6, pp. 777-789. 
 
Schultz, G.P. (1972), “Discounting in the evaluation of projects with time delayed 
benefits,” Circular no. A-94,  Washington, D.C.:  Office of Management and 
Budget. 
 
Smith, D.C., Prentice, R., Thompson, D.J., and Herrmann, W.L., (1975), “Association of 
Exogenous Estrogen and Endometrial Cancer,” The New England Journal of 
Medicine, vol. 293, no. 23, pp. 1164-1166. 
 
Snyder, D.L. and Bhattacharta, R.N., (1990),  “A More Dynamic Economic Model of the 
Optimal Rotation of Multiple-Use Forests,”  Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management, vol. 18, pp.  168-175.   
 
Stillman, R.J., (1982), “In Utero Exposure to Diethylstilbestrol: Adverse Effects On the 
Reproductive Tract and Reproductive Performance in Male and Female 
  144
Offspring,” American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, vol. 142, no. 7, pp. 
905-921. 
 
Strang, W., (1983),  “On the optimal harvesting decision,”  Economic Inquiry,  vol. 21, 
pp. 401-423.  
 
Streitweiser, M.L. (1997),  “Using the pollution abatement costs and expenditures micro 
data for descriptive and analytic research,”  Journal of Economic and Social 
Measurement, 23,  pp. 1-25. 
 
Summers, L.H. (1981),  “Taxation and Corporate Investment:  A q-Theory Approach,” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1, pp. 67-127. 
 
Bank, D., and Smith, N. (2003) “Testicular Cancer Recource Center,” http://tcrc.acor.org/ 
 
Thorp, J.M., Jr., Fowler, W.C., Donehoo, R., Sawicki, C., and Bowes, W.A., Jr. (1990), 
“Antepartum and Intrapartum Events in Women Exposed to Diethylstilbestrol,” 
Obstetrics and Gynecology, vol. 76, no. 5, pp. 828-832. 
 
United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (various years),  
“Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures,”  Current Industrial Reports, MA-
200, United States Government Printing Office. 
  145
 
vom Saal, F.S.,  Cooke, P.S., Buchanan, D.S., Palanza, P., Kristina, K.A., Nagel, S.C., 
Parimigiana, S., and Welshons, W.V. (1998), “A Physiological Based Approach 
to the Study of Bisphenol A and Other Estrogenic Chemicals on the Size of 
Reproductive Organs, Daily Sperm Production, and Behavior,”  Toxicology and 
Industrial Health, vol. 14, nos. 1-2, pp. 239-260. 
 
vom Saal, F.S., and Sheehan, D.M. (1998), “Challenging Risk Assessment: Traditional 
toxicological testing cannot detect the adverse effects of very low doses of 
environmental chemical,” Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy, pp. 11-
18. 
 
Wilcox, A.J., Baird, D.D., Weinberg, C.R., Hornsby, P.P., Herbst, A.L., (1995), “Fertility 
In Men Exposed Prenatally to Diethylstilbestrol,” The New England Journal of 
Medicine, vol. 332, no. 21, pp. 1411-1415. 
 
Wilcoxen, P.J. (1988),  “The Effect of Environmental Regulation and Energy Prices on 
US Economic Performance,”  PhD Dissertation, Harvard University. 
 
Wilcoxen, P.J. (1990),  “The Effect of Environmental Regulation on the Capital Stock:  
Stagnation or Renovation?”  mimeo, Harvard University. 
 
  146
Willasen, Y., (1988), “The stochastic rotation problem:  A generalization of Faustmann’s 
formula to stochastic forest growth,”  Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control.  vol. 22, pp.  573-596. 
 
Wingender, R.J., and Niketas, P. (1998), “Development of Methods for the 
Determination of of Bisphenol A in Food Simulants,” Journal of Coatings 
Technology, vol. 70, no. 877, pp. 75-82. 
 
Ziel, H.K., and Finkle, W.D., (1975), “Increased Risk of Endometrial Carcinoma Among 
Users of Conjugated Estrogens,” The New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 293, 
no. 23, pp. 1167-1170. 
  147
 
 
Vita 
 
 
James Bradley Brown was born in El Paso, Texas on December 7, 1972, the son of James 
Wallace Brown and Barbara Jean Brown.  After graduation from Saguaro High School in 
Scottsdale, Arizona, in 1991, he entered the University of Arizona in Tucson.  He 
received the degree of Bachelor of Arts from the University of Arizona in May, 1996.  In 
August 1996, he entered the Graduate School in Economics at the University of Texas in 
Austin.  He was married to Marlo Ann Perry on January 3, 1998, in Scottsdale, Arizona.  
In May 1998 he received the degree of Master of Science from the University of Texas.  
In the summer of 2001, he was awarded the Hale Fellowship by the Economics 
Department at the University of Texas.  In August 2002, he began his work at the Center 
for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition in the Food and Drug Administration in College 
Park, Maryland. 
 
 
 
Permanent Address: 420 Saint Lawrence Dr., Silver Spring, Maryland  20901 
 
This dissertation was typed by the author. 
 
 
